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A MODIFIED THEORY OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL 
COURTS: THE CASE OF ARISING-UNDER 
JURISDICTION 
Simona Grossi* 
To my Civil Procedure Team 2012-2013 
Abstract: This Article examines and evaluates the legal process method as a perspective 
from which to assess the law of federal courts. It then offers a modified approach to legal 
process that encompasses the full range of considerations that ought to inform modern 
judicial decision-making in this context. With that modified approach in mind, the article 
describes and critiques the Supreme Court’s statutory arising-under jurisprudence, both as 
originally developed and as currently practiced. The article shows that while the Court’s 
early “arising-under” jurisprudence was founded on durable principles and on the reasoned 
application of those principles, more recent decisions by the Court have strayed from that 
approach in service of a more mechanical jurisprudence. This approach seems to be premised 
more on case-management concerns than on the congressionally endorsed value of providing 
a federal forum for the interpretation and application of federal law. The article ends by 
examining the Court’s decision in Gunn v. Minton. As the article explains, Gunn offered the 
Court an opportunity to redirect the arising-under analysis back toward a perspective that 
would more closely reflect the legitimate and enduring principles of federal question 
jurisdiction. The Court, however, missed that opportunity and instead endorsed a mechanical, 
four-part test as a substitute for reasoned analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 On February 20, 2013, the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Gunn v. Minton.1 There the Court revisited the scope of the federal 
courts’ statutory “arising-under” jurisdiction in the context of a legal 
malpractice suit premised on alleged attorney errors committed in a prior 
patent litigation.2 The significance of the decision transcends the specific 
context in which it arose. Although Gunn involved patent law arising-
under jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338,3 that jurisdictional standard is 
interpreted in precisely the same manner as the similarly worded § 1331 
standard.4 Hence, the decision in Gunn applies to a full range of federal 
question cases in which a federal issue is embedded in a state-law claim. 
In addition, and of equal importance, an assessment of Gunn and the law 
of arising-under jurisdiction provides an opportunity to revisit and 
reexamine the theoretical foundation of the law of federal courts.5 
1. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
2. Id. at 1062–63. 
3. Id. at 1062. 
4. Id. at 1064. 
5. See Simona Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens Reconsidered, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 
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The Gunn opinion was highly anticipated by the legal community 
because three decades of prior decisions by the Court had generated 
considerable confusion as to the scope of arising-under jurisdiction. This 
was particularly so in cases where the jurisdictionally relevant federal 
ingredient was embedded in a state law claim—so called “federal 
ingredient” cases. Some commentators hoped that the Court would adopt 
the Holmes “creation test”6 as the exclusive measure of arising-under 
jurisdiction.7 Others hoped for a clarification of the federal-ingredient 
test.8 Still others, like this author, hoped that the Court would redirect 
the jurisdictional analysis back to the fundamental principles that once 
animated the Court’s arising-under jurisprudence.9 
With the decision now in hand, everyone should be disappointed. The 
Court did little to clarify the underlying doctrine and virtually nothing to 
develop a coherent theoretical approach to jurisdictional questions. As I 
will show, Gunn runs afoul of foundational theoretical principles at the 
heart of the law of federal courts10 and retains the Court’s misdirected 
jurisdictional focus on an untenable distinction between what constitutes 
a cause of action and what constitutes an enforceable right. 
The specific jurisdictional issue in Gunn focused on what had come to 
be known as the third and fourth prongs of the “Grable test,”11 a four-
part test12 designed to measure the scope of federal-ingredient 
jurisdiction. Thus, the critical questions in Gunn were whether the 
federal ingredient embedded in the plaintiff’s state-law claim was 
substantial13—the third prong—and whether the exercise of jurisdiction 
over that claim would upset the congressionally mandated balance 
between federal and state courts14—the fourth prong. Lower courts 
considering Grable’s four-part test had been struggling with the 
interpretation and application of both of these prongs. Some had adopted 
2014); Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth With No Exit, 47 AKRON L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014).  
6. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
7. Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 1–2, 25, Gunn v. Minton, 
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 11-1118). 
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity & Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the 
Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 388–89, 451–52 (2012).  
9. See infra text accompanying notes 137–145.  
10. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959). 
11. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
12. Id. at 314. 
13. Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066–69 (2013). 
14. Id. at 1068–69. 
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detailed and highly technical doctrinal tests that led to counterintuitive 
results where jurisdiction was denied over concededly “significant” 
federal questions.15 Others had adopted a more conceptual approach, 
seemingly designed to apply the Grable test and, at the same time, avoid 
that test’s obvious strictures.16 Some lower courts actually confessed that 
the jurisdictional determination was subjective and speculative and that, 
under similar circumstances, different judges might reach different 
conclusions.17 While the Gunn Court did address the third and fourth 
prongs of the Grable test, it did little other than endorse its previous 
iterations of those elements, providing neither a defense for them nor a 
principled method through which they might be applied in the future. 
Thus, much of the confusion over federal jurisdictional standards that 
preceded Gunn remains unresolved, and will remain so until the Court 
adopts a principled, theoretically grounded approach to federal question 
jurisdiction. 
In Part I.A, I revisit and critique the philosophy of the legal process 
school as applicable to the specific context of federal courts, and I offer 
a modified approach to the school’s foundational method. In Part I.B, I 
identify the core principles at the heart of arising-under jurisdiction and 
suggest an analytical model that is premised on those principles and 
capable of yielding predictable, nonsubjective conclusions. In Part II, I 
offer Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Gully v. First National Bank18 as an 
exemplar of the theoretical and analytical model developed in Part I. Part 
III examines more recent arising-under cases and shows that, beginning 
in the 1980s, Gully’s approach to jurisdiction was abandoned and 
replaced by a maze of increasingly complex doctrinal tests that are 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles that animated Gully. Part IV 
presents a case study of Gunn v. Minton,19 describing the basic 
controversy and the lower courts’ decisions. In Part V, I offer a Gully-
based solution to the arising-under issue in Gunn, and in Part VI, I 
present and critique the Supreme Court’s resolution of the same case. 
Finally, in Part VII, I offer concluding remarks regarding the future 
direction of federal question jurisdiction. 
15. See, e.g., Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 553 U.S. 1031 (2008). 
16. See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
17. E.g., Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 561. 
18. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
19. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
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I. TOWARD A THEORY OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
Gunn offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to return to Gully’s 
principled approach or, at the very least, to provide a comprehensible 
map that would assist lower federal courts in navigating the current 
doctrinal maze. The Court, regrettably, missed that opportunity. Instead, 
the Court endorsed a formulaic approach that disserves well-established 
principles of jurisdiction and does little to allay the confusion. 
Regrettably, this test also invites results inconsistent with the 
congressionally mandated goal of providing a federal forum for the 
interpretation and application of federal law. 
In the early twentieth century, Roscoe Pound lamented what he saw 
as an increasing reliance on “mechanical” jurisprudence, a form of 
judicial decision-making that proceeds through structured formulas and 
uses conceptions as ultimate solutions rather than premises from which 
to reason.20 As Pound saw it, this type of jurisprudence offers narrow 
rules that confine judicial discretion, leading judges to try to fit the case 
to the rule rather than the rule to the case.21 
It is true that the common law method proceeds through case law, and 
judicial opinions give contour and content to the applied principles and 
rules. This is, indeed, the beauty and strength of the common law 
system. However, in articulating and applying principles and rules, 
judges should not fail to link the resulting doctrines and formulas to the 
underlying principles and ideas from which those doctrines and formulas 
are derived.22 When they fail to do so, their “mechanical” jurisprudence 
disserves the ends of justice. 
Over a century ago, Pound sensed that the common law method was 
increasingly exposed to the risks of mechanical jurisprudence, and thus 
encouraged legal thinkers to revisit the relevant conceptions at the heart 
of legal doctrine and thereby lay a sure foundation for legal analysis.23 
Thus, in an effort to unearth the principles that originally guided the 
arising-under jurisdictional analysis, I turn to the theory of federal courts 
as developed by the legal process school and suggest a model that might 
return the current jurisprudence to a method of legal analysis that is 
more faithful to the underlying arising-under principles and conceptions. 
20. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 620–21 (1908). 
21. Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 365 (1913).  
22. Pound, supra note 20, at 622–23. 
23. Id. 
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A. Legal Process and Beyond 
In an article written in 1994, Richard Fallon lamented a former 
teacher’s observation that the study of federal courts had become an 
“intellectual backwater.”24 Fallon mounted a hearty defense to this 
charge, and in so doing endorsed the continuing vitality of the legal 
process school, from which the scholarly discipline of “Federal Courts” 
emerged in the 1950s.25 Despite this endorsement, Fallon noted that 
legal process theory was born of a different era—post-Lochner and pre-
Warren Court—and that modern circumstances and perceptions of the 
law and of the role of federal courts might require some modification of 
the animating principles and methodology.26 He also called for future 
federal courts scholarship that would, among other things, use the legal 
process method to provide “critical analysis of cases and 
doctrines, . . . proposals for law reform, . . . [and] efforts to identify 
immanent values or purposes in light of which bodies of law might be 
rationalized . . . .”27 
I agree with Fallon that legal process remains a worthy perspective 
from which to examine the law of federal courts, and my article falls 
within the scholarly agenda identified by him. But as Fallon and others 
have recognized, legal process theory needs to be revitalized in light of 
current jurisprudential developments and insights.28 I have some 
thoughts on the direction that a new theory of federal courts should take, 
an approach that both borrows and diverges from the legal process 
model. 
B. Classic Legal Process Theory 
As is well known, the legal process school is directly traceable to the 
work of Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.29 And while the 
influence of Hart and Sacks may have waned during the 1960s, their 
24. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 955 (1994). 
25. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM (1953).  
26. Fallon, supra note 24, at 959–60. 
27. Id. at 977. 
28. E.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal 
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. 
REV. 397 (2005); Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between 
Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (2010). 
29. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). 
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basic ideas have been woven into the law of federal courts and have 
remained persistently influential. 
Professor Philip Frickey, a modern proponent of legal process, 
described the Hart and Sacks theory as one that viewed all law, 
“including the legislature’s role in statutory creation and the 
administrative and judicial roles of statutory implementation and 
application” as part of a “purposive endeavor designed to promote social 
utility.”30 Frickey noted that Hart and Sacks “assumed the legislature to 
be made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably, and the judges interpreting statutes to be engaged in the 
reasoned elaboration of those purposes as they could be made to fit 
within the broader legal fabric.”31 Thus, as Frickey saw Hart and Sacks’ 
view, “it was simply unacceptable to conclude that a statute lacked a 
sensible purpose.”32 Further, “unless it was impossible to conclude 
otherwise, courts were to avoid the perspective of cynical observers who 
might see only short-term political compromise rather than the embrace 
of reasonable public policy purposes.”33 
More specifically, legal process theory can be seen as premised on 
five interrelated elements: institutional settlement, anti-formalism, rule 
of law, reasoned elaboration, and neutral principles.34 
1. Institutional Settlement 
The principle of institutional settlement posits that “decisions which 
are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . ought to 
be accepted as binding . . . .”35 In this sense, institutional settlement 
determines what the law “is.” That determination is legitimized by 
reference to institutional allocations and institutionally-relevant 
procedures and practices through which the determination is made. 
Consistent with this principle, both legislatures and courts make law, 
each within their own assigned sphere and each according to its own 
established procedures.36 
30. Frickey, supra note 28, at 405. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See Fallon, supra note 24, at 963–70. Fallon also identifies a sixth principle, structural 
interpretation. Id. at 965. For reasons I will explain in the text, I treat that principle separately. See 
infra text accompanying notes 73–81. 
35. HART & SACKS, supra note 29, at 4. 
36. Similarly, decades before Hart & Sacks, Benjamin Cardozo noted that judges must legislate 
“interstitially,” where there are gaps in the law and, when they do so, their decisions are legitimate. 
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In the words of Hart and Sacks, “these procedures and their 
accompanying doctrines and practices will come to be seen as the most 
significant and enduring part of the whole legal system, because they are 
the matrix of everything else.”37 One could say that from a legal process 
perspective, the way things are done will determine, to a large extent, 
what will and can be done.38 
2. Anti-Formalism 
The anti-formalism principle rejects rigid interpretations of the law 
and posits instead that the law should be read in accord with evolving 
circumstances and a pluralistic range of norms and interests. As Hart put 
it, the law should be considered as “a continuous process of becoming. If 
morality [for example] has a place in the ‘becoming,’ it has a place in 
the ‘is.’”39 The anti-formalism principle does not embrace legal realism, 
but attempts to stake out a middle ground between realism and 
positivism.40 This approach to judicial decision-making is sometimes 
described as “purposive.”41 It also strongly suggests that the judicial 
decision-making process consists of something more than merely finding 
and applying the law. Indeed, it recognizes that judges do, indeed, make 
law.42 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 69–70 (1921). The gaps in the 
law where judges are required to “legislate” are essential to any legal system, and when a legislature 
overplays its hand by imposing too much detail it runs against the spirit of the law.  
37. HART & SACKS, supra note 29, at 6. 
38. See id. 
39. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 930 (1951) 
(emphasis in original). 
40. See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in 
the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 619 (1991) (describing the distinction between 
Legal Realism and the Legal Process school in terms of the limits imposed on the adjudictory role 
by Legal Process). 
41. Post, supra note 28, at 1332–36. Cardozo also thought that judges made law and, therefore, 
operated within the “legislator’s wisdom.” CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 115. He also saw a 
commonality in the methods used by judges and legislators: “The choice of methods, the 
appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by like considerations for the one as for the other. 
Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence.” Id. at 113. 
42. Cardozo also believed law had to be conceived as something fluid and in a continuous process 
of becoming in order to reflect and properly respond to human needs. In his words, “Nothing is 
stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an endless ‘becoming.’” CARDOZO, 
supra note 36, at 28. 
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3. Rule of Law 
As Fallon observes, the rule of law “implies courts,”43 and “requires 
the availability of judicial remedies sufficient to vindicate fundamental 
legal principles.”44 Thus, although legal process recognizes the authority 
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, the theory also 
recognizes that “the power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to 
regulate rights—rights to judicial process, whatever those are, and 
substantive rights . . . .”45 As such, the power to regulate jurisdiction is 
subject to the rule of law principle that ensures the availability of courts 
to enforce substantive rights.46 As the foregoing makes clear, the rule of 
law principle is neither the “law of rules”47 nor an invitation to embrace 
formalism. 
4. Reasoned Elaboration 
The principle of reasoned elaboration means exactly what it suggests. 
For a judicial decision to be legitimate, it must be supported by a 
principled and logical explanation. It is this “role of reason” that 
distinguishes a legitimate judicial judgment from a non-judicial political 
choice. This distinction is, in essence, one between the “exercise of 
reason” and an “an act of willfulness,”48 with only the former being 
properly characterized as judicial in nature.49 
5. Neutral Principles 
Finally, the principle of consistency with the broader legal fabric, 
which is closely related to the principle of reasoned elaboration, requires 
that judicial decisions be premised on a legal principle that transcends 
the immediate facts of the case, the particulars before the court. In his 
43. Fallon, supra note 24, at 965. 
44. Id. 
45. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25, at 317. 
46. Id. at 318. 
47. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
48. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 11. 
49. See id. at 31–35 (discussing the lack of reasoned analysis in the Equal Protection cases 
decided by per curiam opinions after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The idea 
of reasoned elaboration was fully embraced by Cardozo, who saw both deductive and inductive 
reasoning as essential to the process of judicial decision-making. It was also, in his view, important 
to know “why and how the choice was made between one logic and another.” CARDOZO, supra note 
36, at 41. He further observed, “[i]n law, as in every other branch of knowledge, the truths given by 
induction tend to form the premises for new deductions.” Id. at 47. 
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famous article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,50 
Herbert Wechsler explained that a “principled decision, in the sense I 
have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in 
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend 
any immediate result that is involved.”51 This has become known as the 
principle of “neutrality.” As I will explain below, I believe that the 
adjective “durable” more accurately describes this principle.52 
C. Criticism of the Classic Theory 
I accept most of the above postulates of the classic legal process 
method, and particularly agree with the principles of reasoned 
elaboration and neutrality as further explained below. An opinion that is 
not consistent with these principles naturally leads to the suspicion that 
the decision is not legitimate.53 Of course, I recognize that when 
deciding cases, judges will necessarily draw from their own personal 
experience and opinions.54 However, the principles of reasoned 
elaboration and neutrality, sensibly applied, provide a framework 
through which the legitimacy of a judicial decision can be measured 
from a shared perspective of legal principles and logic that should 
transcend the individual judge’s policy preferences in a particular case. 
Moreover, these principles may help a judge check her personal instincts 
in a way that will bring greater consistency and fairness to the law. 
Professor Robert Post has criticized the principle of reasoned 
elaboration to the extent that it is premised on the dichotomy between 
“reason” and “will.” According to Post, this dichotomy is “far too crude 
to capture the difference between law and politics. Reason exists in 
politics, just as will exists in law.”55 
At a descriptive and empirical level, I agree with Post. Reason and 
will play a role in both judicial and political decision-making. Legal 
process theorists do not deny that. They do however insist that a judicial 
decision be justified by reasoned elaboration, and recognize that there is 
no such requirement that a political decision do so. In a sense, reasoned 
50. Wechsler, supra note 10. 
51. Id. at 19. Like Wechsler, Cardozo believed in the value of principles generated from the 
transitory particulars through a process of “free decision” and “generalizations.” CARDOZO, supra 
note 36, at 17–25. 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57–64.  
53. Fallon, supra note 24, at 964, 969–70. 
54. See Wells, supra note 40, at 642–43. But see Fallon, supra note 24, at 973 n.85 (responding to 
Wells).  
55. Post, supra note 28, at 1328. 
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elaboration is an institutional requirement imposed on the judicial 
branch, while majority rule is the institutional requirement of the 
political process. In stating this disagreement with Post, I am not 
drawing a bright line between the judicial and the political processes, but 
only recognizing the requirement that a judicial decision be justified in 
terms other than will, even if that judicial opinion is the product of a 
five-to-four vote. 
Post has also criticized the neutrality principle as being either trivial 
(i.e., the magistrate must be neutral as between the parties), incoherent 
(i.e., a “neutral principle” is an oxymoron), or an improper endorsement 
of non-consequentialism (i.e., the notion that a judge should ignore the 
consequences of her decisions).56 
I appreciate Post’s critique, but I do not fully agree with it. The 
problem, as I see it, can be traced to Wechsler’s unfortunate word choice 
(“neutral principles”) and to his somewhat incomplete and short-sighted 
defense of the principle. As to “neutrality,” the word itself is an easy 
target. If it is reduced to a call for a neutral magistrate, it states the 
obvious; if it is meant to “neuter” values, as Post suggests it might,57 it is 
pernicious. On the other hand, if it suggests no more than a non-
discriminatory application of a legal standard to a general pattern, then it 
might be entitled to more weight. I would read Wechsler’s neutrality 
principle in this latter fashion. As such, I understand him to be saying 
that a “neutral principle” is one that must be durable and capable of 
application to a wide range of similarly situated cases. Neutrality here 
does not relate to magistrates or values, but to applications. Professor 
Kent Greenawalt captured this idea well when he observed that “[a] 
person gives a neutral reason, in Wechsler’s sense, if he states a basis for 
a decision that he would be willing to follow in other situations to which 
it applies.”58 
This same idea of durability was expressed by Benjamin Cardozo 
when he observed, “[g]iven a mass of particulars, a congeries of 
judgments on related topics, the principle that unifies and rationalizes 
them has a tendency, and a legitimate one, to project and extend itself to 
new cases within the limits of its capacity to unify and rationalize.”59 He 
further explained, such a durable principle, “has the primacy that comes 
56. Id. at 1330–31. 
57. Id. at 1330. 
58. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 
985 (1978). 
59. CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 31. 
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from natural and orderly and logical succession.”60 
Post’s non-consequentialist critique of neutrality is more troubling. 
Certainly, a judge must attend to both the long- and short-term 
consequences of her decision, and the anti-formalist principle fully 
supports this proposition. As Post amply demonstrates, a decision cannot 
be “purposive” and at the same time oblivious to consequences.61 As 
with neutrality, I would read Wechsler’s admonition that judges should 
be aloof from the immediate consequences to mean that a judge should 
not alter a durable principle simply to avoid a result that is averse to her 
individual preferences. As Greenawalt puts it, “[t]he principles that 
support a decision must be . . . adequately general as well as neutral. 
They must reach out beyond the narrow circumstances of the case.”62 
That Wechsler can be interpreted as Post suggests may be a product 
of Wechsler’s inability to discover a durable principle that would “reach 
out beyond the narrow circumstances”63 of Brown v. Board of 
Education64 and justify the series of per curiam anti-apartheid decisions 
that applied Brown in contexts other than public school education.65 
Wechsler’s failure to discover such a durable principle may have tainted 
“neutrality” as a persuasive ground from which to assess judicial 
decision-making. 
I strongly agree with Post that one should not adopt a vision of 
judicial decision-making solely based on the judicial craft or on the 
ability of a judge to discover and apply the law. Rather, courts must 
recognize the long-term political and social consequences of their 
decisions and sometimes act as lawmaking statesmen, as the Court did in 
Brown. I also believe that Post and Frickey are correct when they assert 
that the classic legal process theory invites precisely this type of 
purposive statesmanship in appropriate and limited circumstances.66 In 
short, I would interpret Wechsler’s neutrality principle in a manner that 
avoids Post’s non-consequentialist criticism. 
Some of the other legal process postulates also require closer 
examination. For example, the principle of institutional settlement exalts 
the primacy of procedure over substantive rights. It is true that without 
procedure there would be no enforceable substantive rights other than 
60. Id. 
61. Post, supra note 28, at 1329. 
62. Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 987. 
63. Id. 
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
65. See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 31–35. 
66. See Frickey, supra note 28, at 454, 461; Post, supra note 28, at 1323, 1332–36. 
 
                                                     
07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013 5:11 PM 
2013] ARISING-UNDER JURISDICTION 973 
through the non-judicial will of the sovereign. It is equally true, 
however, that without substantive rights there would be no point in 
having a system of procedure. Procedure is instrumental. It exists to 
ensure the fair and efficient delivery of justice, and the ends of justice 
necessarily include the vindication of substantive rights. Hence, a fully 
realized theory of legal process ought to factor in the extent to which 
procedure accomplishes this ultimately substantive goal, namely, the 
protection of individual claims of right. 
D. Legal Process and the Law of Federal Courts 
In their path-breaking casebook, The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System,67 Hart and Wechsler added a sixth principle to the legal process 
method, namely, the principle of structural interpretation. Structural 
interpretation requires federal courts to take principles of federalism and 
separation of powers into account when creating, interpreting, or 
applying the law of federal courts.68 In fact, the very first sentence in the 
preface to their casebook references the importance of “our federalism” 
to the study of federal courts.69 On the next page the authors offer a 
similar, albeit less insistent, respect to the principle of separation of 
powers.70 The principle of structural interpretation is now often regarded 
as an essential component of the legal process method in the context of 
the law of federal courts.71 Thus, in determining the allocation of powers 
between federal courts and state courts, and between federal courts and 
the political branches of the federal government, federalism and 
separation of powers should, according to this expanded version of legal 
process theory, play a critical role. 
In my view, the principle of structural interpretation is premised on a 
limited vision of constitutional values in that it emphasizes only two 
aspects of our constitutional system—federalism and separation of 
powers—at the expense of other equally weighty constitutional 
considerations, including the structural role of the federal judiciary in the 
vindication of individual claims of right. As the Court recognized in 
Marbury v. Madison: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever 
67. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25. 
68. See id. at xi. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at xii. 
71. Fallon, supra note 24, at 965. 
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he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to 
afford that protection . . . . The government of the United States 
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of 
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right.72 
The principle of structural interpretation thus needs to be more 
broadly conceived. Federalism means something more than “states’ 
rights.”73 It reflects a principle that defers to the states in matters 
constitutionally pertinent to the states, while recognizing the paramount 
interest of the national sovereign in matters pertinent to it. Similarly, 
separation of powers is not merely a limit on the scope of judicial 
authority; rather it also imposes an affirmative responsibility on the 
judicial branch to act as a check on the political branches. 
Finally, any complete theory of the law of federal courts must 
incorporate the system of individual rights into the structural equation. 
Federalism and separation of powers can themselves indirectly protect 
individual rights by decentralizing the exercise of power. However, they 
do not necessarily operate in that fashion, and the founding generation in 
adopting the Bill of Rights eventually concluded that specific protections 
for individual rights were an essential component of the constitutional 
structure. Of course, we can see this same balancing of principles in the 
individual rights component of constitutional structure as we do with 
federalism and separation of powers. Individual rights are always subject 
to countervailing constitutional interests. It is for this reason that no right 
is absolute. But individual rights are, emphatically, part of the 
constitutional structure. Hence, properly understood, the principle of 
structural interpretation ought to take into account the full dimension of 
constitutional considerations. Certainly, there is no case for making a 
one-sided vision of “our federalism” the primary focus of a 
jurisprudence of federal courts.74 
72. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Of course, famously, Mr. Marbury received no remedy from the 
Supreme Court. Id. at 138. But this outcome was not because the law did not afford him a remedy, 
but because Mr. Marbury sought his remedy in a constitutionally impermissible tribunal. Id. The 
outcome, therefore, does not undermine the principle. 
73. In Bond v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011), the Supreme Court asserted that 
the principle of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment is also intended to protect the rights 
of the individuals. Id. at 2364. But any such protection is at best indirect and surely does not 
encompass the full range of individual rights protections embodied in the Constitution and in federal 
statutes.  
74. We can see the “our federalism” principle’s dominance at work in the related contexts of the 
Younger doctrine, see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 
(1986); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 
 
                                                     
 
07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013 5:11 PM 
2013] ARISING-UNDER JURISDICTION 975 
In addition, the principle of structural interpretation potentially runs 
afoul of at least two other legal process principles: anti-formalism and 
rule of law. As indicated above, the anti-formalism principle provides 
that judicial interpretation should take into account a pluralistic array of 
interests in interpreting the law.75 Yet, the principle of structural 
interpretation appears to give singular and dominant weight to a narrow 
vision of structure over a vast array of other considerations, some of 
which have a constitutional dimension. In this sense, the principle of 
structural interpretation can be seen as a product of legal formalism, for 
it introduces a rigid hierarchy into the interpretive metrics. The clash 
with the rule of law principle is even more striking. That principle 
implies the availability of federal courts to vindicate federal rights.76 
However, Hart and Wechsler’s law of federal courts is premised more on 
power arrangements than it is on individual claims of right. In this way, 
the principle of structural interpretation may illegitimately dominate the 
rule of law principle. 
E. Modified Model of Legal Process 
Drawing from legal process theory and the above-described critiques 
and responses, I offer the following model to measure the legitimacy of 
judicial decision-making in the context of the law of federal courts. 
In measuring the legitimacy of any judicial decision pertaining to the 
law of federal courts, one must: (1) take into account the respective 
institutional roles of Congress and the judiciary; (2) accept the purposive 
role of judicial decision-making, including both the craft and the 
statesmen aspect of that role; (3) examine the consistency of the decision 
with the rule of law and that principle’s insistence on a judicial forum 
for the vindication of individual claims of right; and (4) measure the 
decision based on its fidelity to durable legal principles articulated 
through a reasoned elaboration. In addition, any such decision should 
reflect the full range of structural concerns that animate the Constitution, 
including a balanced approach to federalism, separation of powers, and 
individual rights. 
I have selected this model to test the legitimacy of judicial opinions in 
the context of the law of federal courts because it is comprehensive, 
(1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the Eleventh Amendment, see Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)—all cases in which access to 
the federal courts was denied, thus forcing litigants to take their federal claims to state court. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47. 
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takes into account the full range of constitutional considerations, and 
places courts within the legitimate and recognized bounds of the judicial 
function. This model repels “the mechanistic and transcendental 
nonsense of legal formalism”77 and, at the same time, avoids an 
unrestricted endorsement of legal realism by inviting results that are 
premised on “predictable and nonsubjective conclusions.”78 
F. A Claim-Centered, Fundamental Principles Approach to Arising-
Under Jurisdiction 
I turn now to the specific context of arising-under jurisdiction and 
identify its core principles. I then suggest an approach to arising-under 
jurisdiction that is consistent with those principles and with my modified 
approach to legal process and that avoids the trap of a formalistic or 
mechanical formula. 
The generally accepted model of arising-under jurisdiction begins 
with the “Holmes creation test,” so named as a product of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s dissenting declaration that “a suit cannot be said to 
arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action.”79 
This model presumes that the Holmes creation test represents the 
primary vehicle for determining jurisdiction.80 According to this view, 
there are two limited exceptions to the creation test, one that extends 
jurisdiction to some non-federal claims that include an essential federal 
ingredient, and one that excludes jurisdiction over federally created 
claims that are essentially governed by state or local law or in which the 
presumed intent of Congress to create jurisdiction is otherwise 
rebutted.81 For several reasons that I will explain below, I believe this 
standard view is misguided. 
While it is sometimes thought that the creation test represents the 
earliest approach to arising-under jurisdiction, this is by no means clear. 
In their recent study, Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins 
show that federal courts in the nineteenth century exercised jurisdiction 
in numerous federal question cases well beyond the contours of the 
77. Post, supra note 28, at 1320 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
78. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1090 (1995). 
79. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
80. See Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013); Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., Inc., v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).  
81. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064–65; Mims v. Arrow Financial Servs., LLC, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 
740, 744 (2012); Grable, 545 U.S. at 311–13, 317 n.5; 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.31[3] (2013); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3562 (3d ed. 1998). 
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creation test.82 This phenomenon occurred both before and after the 
adoption of the Act of 1875, in which Congress vested federal courts 
with general federal question jurisdiction.83 Indeed, not a single case 
references anything akin to a creation test prior to 1916, when the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & 
Bowler Co.84 made a cryptic allusion to such a possibility.85 Rather, the 
vast body of early cases adopted a more inclusive and holistic approach 
to arising-under jurisdiction, one that in no way depended on the source 
of the claim or right asserted. As I will show below, even the decision in 
American Well Works fits well within that established jurisprudence. 
The 1900 decision in Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter86 provides an apt 
example of the holistic approach to arising-under jurisdiction. Shoshone 
involved a dispute over the entitlement to a mining claim on federally 
owned lands.87 A federal statute required any person who disputed 
another party’s application for a mining claim to file an “adverse suit” in 
“a court of competent jurisdiction” within thirty days of having filed the 
adverse claim with the register of land.88 Either local custom or state 
property law would usually determine entitlement to the property.89 At 
best, any potential federal issue remained in the background. As a 
consequence, the Supreme Court concluded that such adverse claims did 
not necessarily arise under federal law.90 
Shoshone is often described as an exception to the creation test,91 but 
that description is inaccurate. At the time Shoshone was decided, there 
was no creation test—American Well Works was still sixteen years in the 
future. It is also not clear that the federal statute at issue in Shoshone 
created a cause of action because that statute is worded more as a statute 
of limitations than as a cause of action.92 Most importantly, however, the 
82. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151 (2009). 
83. Id. at 2157–70. 
84. 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
85. See infra text accompanying notes 102–108. 
86. 177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
87. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 87 F. 801, 801–02 (9th Cir. 1898). 
88. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89. Id. at 508. 
90. Id. at 509. 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
92. The congressional statute at issue in Shoshone provided: 
It shall be the duty of the adverse claimant, within thirty days after filing his claim, to 
commence proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, to determine the question of the 
right of possession, and prosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment; and a 
failure so to do shall be a waiver of his adverse claim.  
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rationale adopted by the Shoshone Court did not focus on the source of 
the plaintiff’s right to sue, but rather on whether the adverse suit called 
for the “construction or effect” of federal law.93 As such, Shoshone does 
not represent an exception to a rule, but an application of a rule. 
The Court took a similar principled approach in Shulthis v. 
McDougal.94 There, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in a federal circuit court 
seeking to quiet title to a tract of land located on an Indian reservation.95 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.96 In response, plaintiff argued that the case was one 
arising under federal law because the ownership of the tract was 
ultimately traceable to a grant from the federal government.97 In 
resolving the jurisdictional question, the Court explained that “[a] suit to 
enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is 
not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws.”98 
Rather, in the Court’s view, a case arises under federal law only if “it 
really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the 
validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of 
which the result depends.”99 Applying that principle, the Court rejected 
plaintiff’s attempt to premise jurisdiction solely on the federal source of 
his claimed right of ownership.100 Instead, the Court explained that for a 
case to fall within the scope of statutory arising-under jurisdiction, it was 
not enough that federal law be the source of the rights sought to be 
enforced.101 
We now come to American Well Works.102 The notion that the 
American Well Works Court endorsed the creation test as the true 
measure of arising-under jurisdiction is erroneous. American Well Works 
involved a suit by an individual who claimed that his business had been 
damaged by the defendant’s disparagement of his patent and by the 
Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 7, 17 Stat. 93 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 29–30 (2006)) 
(emphasis added). Clearly, the language of the statute speaks in terms of a duty to file a claim and 
not in terms suggesting the creation of any such claim. 
93. 177 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94. 225 U.S. 561 (1912). 
95. Id. at 565. 
96. Id. at 568. 
97. Id. at 569–70. 
98. Id. at 569. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 569–70. 
101. Id. at 568–69. 
102. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
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defendant’s threat to sue him and his customers for patent 
infringement.103 The Court explained that plaintiff’s claim involved no 
controversy over a question of federal law, including patent law.104 The 
fact that the narrative of the case somehow involved a patent was not 
enough to make the case one arising under patent law.105 Rather, the case 
involved no more than a state-created disparagement of business claim 
in which patent law played no role. Hence, federal question jurisdiction 
was lacking.106 
This result in American Well Works was fully consistent with 
Shoshone and Shulthis, since the case did not involve a “controversy 
respecting the validity, construction, or effect of” federal law.107 
However, Justice Holmes, writing for the American Well Works Court, 
wrapped his conclusion in an epigram: “[a] suit arises under the law that 
creates the cause of action.”108 Given the precedents then extant, this 
pithy statement was both too broad and too narrow, for it substituted a 
mechanical test for the careful consideration of the role that a federal 
issue might play within the context of the pending case. 
That American Well Works had not endorsed a “creation test” was 
made clear five years later, in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.109 
There, the plaintiff, a shareholder in the defendant trust company, sued 
the trust seeking to enjoin it from purchasing bonds that had been issued 
under the terms of a federal statute that the plaintiff claimed to be 
unconstitutional.110 Because the trust was only authorized to purchase 
“legal” bonds, the plaintiff claimed that the planned purchase of the 
federal bonds represented a breach of fiduciary duty, a claim created by 
state law.111 Notwithstanding, the Court held that the case was one 
arising under federal law because the directors were proceeding to 
purchase the bonds and because the shareholder objected to that purpose 
on the ground that the bonds “were issued under an unconstitutional 
law.”112 Thus, in the Court’s view the case arose under federal law 
because “the constitutional validity of an act of Congress . . . is directly 
103. Id. at 258–59. 
104. Id. at 259–60. 
105. Id. at 260. 
106. Id. 
107. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912).  
108. 241 U.S. at 260; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2171–78. 
109. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
110. Id. at 195–96. 
111. Id. at 197–98. 
112. Id. at 201. 
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drawn in question.”113 
The decision in Smith did not create a novel approach to jurisdiction. 
In fact, as Woolhandler and Collins have amply demonstrated, Smith 
reflected a standard exercise of federal question jurisdiction that was 
well recognized in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.114 
Justice Holmes dissented, and took his epigram a step further by 
insisting on the exclusivity of the creation principle: “a suit cannot be 
said to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of 
action.”115 But the majority, following the standard line of jurisprudence, 
clearly rejected this view. In fact, the majority neither referenced 
American Well Works nor responded to Justice Holmes’s solo dissent.116 
The American Well Works majority was not alone in overlooking the 
creation test. In the ensuing years, that test played virtually no role in the 
Court’s arising under jurisprudence.117 Indeed, it did not rise to 
prominence in that jurisprudence until the Court’s decision in Franchise 
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust in 1983.118 
According to Woolhandler and Collins, Holmes’s creation test 
formula might have been the result of “[Holmes’s] collapsing of the 
concepts of primary and remedial rights as part of his predictive view of 
law.”119 Similarly, Professor Lumen Mulligan argues that Holmes’s 
position stemmed “from his famous ‘bad man’ theory of law—the view 
that law is best understood not from a moral vantage point, but from that 
of the bad man who cares only to know the predictable judicial 
responses to his conduct.”120 In other words, according to Mulligan, 
113. Id. 
114. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2171–78. 
115. Smith, 255 U.S. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
116. See id. at 195–213. 
117. Prior to 1983, only four Supreme Court majority opinions cited American Well Works, and 
none of those citations endorsed the creation test or suggested that any such test was the exclusive 
or even primary method through which to establish arising-under jurisdiction. See Hathorn v. 
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 n.18 (1981) (state courts may decide a variety of questions involving 
patent law); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 696 (1963) 
(included in string cite pertaining to jurisdiction); Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451 n.4 
(1943) (defects in state court jurisdiction not cured by removal); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (same). 
118. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). The creation test did, however, hold a prominent position in the first 
edition of Hart & Wechsler’s casebook, perhaps paving the way to its eventual inclusion in the 
Court’s arising-under jurisprudence. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25, at 752. 
119. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2187. 
120. Lumen N. Mulligan, You Can’t Go Holmes Again, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (2012); see 
also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1897) (“If 
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the 
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds 
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Holmes’s jurisdictional theory “focused solely upon the enforcement 
aspect of law, which in the civil context corresponds to causes of action 
and not rights per se.”121 Mulligan’s view is that Holmes’s endorsement 
of a cause-of-action-centric test was both out of step with the then-
current jurisprudential developments in cases such as Shoshone and 
Smith,122 and insufficient to fully embrace the full range of jurisdictional 
possibilities that had been and continued to be recognized by the 
Court.123 Mulligan’s solution is to include “rights” as part of the 
jurisdictional equation and, in so doing, his goal is to create a 
presumption in favor of the exercise of arising-under jurisdiction.124 
I agree with Mulligan’s conclusion but not with his solution. Holmes 
may have indeed adopted the creation test to conform to his bad-man 
theory of law, and his creation-centric approach to jurisdiction is 
certainly inconsistent with the full range of jurisdictional possibilities. 
The true mistake Holmes made, however, was in assuming that the 
cause-of-action component of his equation somehow defined the scope 
of jurisdiction, which is not necessarily so. Mulligan’s solution is simply 
to add the component of “rights” to the jurisdictional equation, but this 
solution invites a similar mechanical approach to jurisdiction by adding 
yet another incomplete test to the inquiry. 
his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience . . . . [The bad man] does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he 
does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of 
his mind.”). 
121. Mulligan, supra note 120, at 240. 
122. Id. at 244–50. The core principle that guided the analysis in cases like Shoshone and Shulthis 
did not focus on the distinction between causes of action and rights, but rather on the claim, which 
is a composite of rights and remedies.  
123. Id. Mulligan’s analysis was prompted by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mims v. 
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012). Mulligan praises that opinion for 
breaking with the Holmes cause-of-action-centric tradition and for recasting the standard §1331 test 
as one that looks to both the cause of action and the right. Although Mulligan’s interpretation of the 
Mims decision is attractive, I don’t think that that opinion can carry the weight of his conclusions. 
The distinction between causes of action and rights was certainly not necessary to the holding in 
Mims and the decision in Mims is just as consistent with the Holmes creation test as it is with 
Mulligan’s more inclusive approach to federal arising-under jurisdiction. At most, the Mims 
decision supports the proposition that when federal law creates the cause of action and establishes 
the rule of decision, there is a strong presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction, but in a sense this 
is really a reiteration of the creation test. In addition, the language from Mims that Mulligan relies 
on is, by his own admission, “inconsistent,” suggesting that the Court was not aware that it was 
making the sophisticated move that Mulligan attributes to it. See Mulligan, supra note 120, at 280. 
Further evidence that Mims did not change the jurisprudential landscape can be found in Gunn v. 
Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), where the Court returned to the cause-of-action-centric 
position, treating it as the primary vehicle for establishing arising-under jurisdiction. Id. at 1064. 
124. See Mulligan, supra note 120, at 287. 
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My approach is different. I would rather focus the jurisdictional 
inquiry on what constitutes a “claim.” Such an approach, as I have 
shown, is both principled and consistent with the traditional approach to 
arising-under jurisdiction, and is also consistent with the modern 
understanding of what constitutes a litigation unit. Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (and under the modern law of res judicata or 
preclusion), a claim is defined by reference to the facts that establish a 
legal right to relief.125 To paraphrase Holmes, a claim arises only under 
the sovereign law that creates it. But some claims are hybrid, their 
component parts being created by more than one sovereign. Such claims 
arise under the laws of all contributing sovereigns, regardless of which 
created the cause of action, which created the right, or which created the 
controlling legal principle. The Holmesian error was not in Holmes’s 
collapse of causes of action and rights into a single concept—which is 
essentially to say “a claim upon which relief can be granted”—but in his 
failure to see that the unification did not dictate the narrow jurisdictional 
test he ultimately endorsed. 
Mulligan falls into a similar trap by drawing a bright line between 
causes of action and rights. Unlike Holmes, Mulligan would allow 
jurisdiction in cases falling on either side of the line.126 And such an 
approach can be used to validate a wider range of the Court’s arising-
under jurisprudence. But it also invites a mechanical distinction between 
claims created by federal law and claims that merely include a federal 
ingredient. In fact, Mulligan’s test would not validate decisions such as 
Smith, where neither the cause of action nor the right was a creature of 
federal law. Rather, federal law was simply an element of the plaintiff’s 
state-created claim. Yet, despite the absence of both a federal cause of 
action and a federal right, the Court nonetheless found jurisdiction 
because the plaintiff’s claim turned on a question of federal law. 
With a proper reading of the foundational arising-under cases—e.g., 
Shoshone, Shulthis, Smith, and American Well Works—and with a 
clearer understanding of what constitutes a claim upon which a relief can 
be granted, the approach I endorse in Part II focuses on the nature of the 
plaintiff’s claim, asking whether the resolution of that claim depends on 
the validity, construction, or effect of federal law. 
125. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (same transaction test for purposes of compulsory 
counterclaims); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (same transaction 
test for purposes of claim preclusion). 
126. Mulligan, supra note 120, at 248–50. 
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II. GULLY REDISCOVERED 
Congress first vested the lower federal courts with general “arising-
under” jurisdiction in the Act of March 3, 1875 (Act of 1875),127 thereby 
giving them “the vast range of power which had lain dormant in the 
Constitution since 1789. These courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of 
fair dealing between citizens of different states and became the primary 
and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the 
Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.”128 The 
available evidence suggests that Congress, in passing the Act of 1875, 
thought that it was vesting lower federal courts with the complete range 
of Article III arising-under jurisdiction.129 As one sponsor of the 
measure explained, the Act gives the federal judiciary “precisely the 
power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing less.”130 
Significantly, at that time, the enforcement of federal rights was often 
dependent on common law and state-created remedies.131 Hence, hybrid 
“federal-ingredient” claims would not have been considered unusual or 
even distinct from a jurisdictional perspective. 
By the first half of the twentieth century, the fundamental principles 
of statutory arising-under jurisdiction were sufficiently familiar and so 
well-settled that in 1936 the Court in Gully v. First National Bank132 
could describe them with confident clarity: 
How and when a case arises “under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States” has been much considered in the books. Some tests are 
well established. To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity 
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an 
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The right 
127. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). 
128. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES MCCAULEY LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928). 
129. In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), the 
Court observed: 
The statute’s “arising under” language tracks similar language in art. III, § 2, of the 
Constitution, which has been construed as permitting Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to 
any case of which federal law potentially “forms an ingredient,” see Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824), and its limited legislative history 
suggests that the 44th Congress may have meant to “confer the whole power which the 
Constitution conferred.”  
Id. at 8 n.8 (citation omitted); see also Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal 
Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 723, 723 n.32–34 (1986) (citing sources).  
130. 2 Cong. Rec. 4987 (1874) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter). 
131. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2157–70. 
132. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
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or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or 
laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and 
defeated if they receive another. A genuine and present controversy, not 
merely a possible or conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto, 
and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, 
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal. Indeed, the 
complaint itself will not avail as a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes 
beyond a statement of the plaintiff’s cause of action and anticipates or 
replies to a probable defense.133 
As the Gully Court recognized, it was established early on that a 
federal court could not exercise original or removal arising-under 
jurisdiction unless the plaintiff’s complaint revealed a claim that 
required resolution of a federal question.134 A federal defense raised by 
the defendant would not suffice.135 Nor would it be sufficient for the 
plaintiff to anticipate such a defense.136 The explanation for this rule was 
that a federal court should be able to assess jurisdiction at the outset by 
examining the pleadings then before it.137 
Beyond this “well-pleaded complaint” rule, the approach to federal 
jurisdiction was directed more toward a flexible assessment of the nature 
of the federal issue presented and the role that issue played as an element 
of the jurisdiction-invoking claim. As noted above, this jurisdictional 
formula had deep roots in the nineteenth century138 and was also fully 
supported by precedent from the early twentieth century. 
The facts of Gully were simple and informative. First National Bank 
agreed to assume the debts of an insolvent national banking 
association.139 Among those debts were taxes owed to the State of 
Mississippi.140 When Gully, the state tax collector, sued First National 
Bank in state court to collect those debts, First National Bank removed 
the case to federal court on the theory that it was one arising under 
federal law since federal law authorized states to tax national banking 
133. Id. at 112–13 (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 197–98; see also Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888). 
135. Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 459 (1894). 
136. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
137. Metcalf, 128 U.S. at 589–90. 
138. See McCain v. City of Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 (1899); St. Joseph & G.I.R. Co. v. Steele, 
167 U.S. 659, 662 (1897); Walker v. Collins, 167 U.S. 57, 59 (1897); Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 
548, 553–54 (1897); Starin v. City of New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885); see also Woolhandler & 
Collins, supra note 82, at 2171–78. 
139. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 111 (1936). 
140. Id.  
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associations.141 In concluding that federal jurisdiction did not exist, the 
Supreme Court first explained that Gully’s claim was built on a contract 
that was governed by Mississippi law.142 While defendant argued that a 
federal controversy existed because the validity of a tax imposed on a 
nationally chartered bank was ultimately a question of federal law, the 
Court disagreed, explaining that federal law played absolutely no role in 
the resolution of the plaintiff’s claim.143 
The Gully Court noted that the key element in the federal question 
jurisdiction analysis was the nature of the claim presented: 
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is the 
attempt to define a “cause of action” without reference to the 
context. To define broadly and in abstract “a case arising under 
the Constitution or laws of the United States” has hazards of a 
kindred order. What is needed is something of that common-
sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations 
which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of 
causation. One could carry the search for causes backward, 
almost without end. Instead, there has been a selective process 
which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the 
other ones aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the 
search for the underlying law. If we follow the ascent far 
enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their 
source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal 
statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient 
restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, 
the courts have formulated the distinction between controversies 
that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that 
are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be 
lost in a maze if we put that compass by.144 
141. Id. at 112. 
142. Id. at 114. 
143. Id. at 115–16. 
144. Id. 117–18 (internal citations omitted). Years before his decision in Gully, Cardozo had 
expressed similar views on legal analysis, when he observed: 
There is the constant need, as every law student knows, to separate the accidental and the non-
essential from the essential and inherent . . . . Only half or less than half of the work has yet 
been done. The problem remains to fix the bounds and the tendencies of development and 
growth, to set the directive force in motion along the right path at the parting of the ways. The 
directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical progression; this I will 
call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy; along the line of historical development; 
this I will call the method of evolution; along the line of the customs of the community; this I 
will call the method of tradition; along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores 
of the day; this I will call the method of sociology. 
CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 30–31.  
 
                                                     
07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013 5:11 PM 
986 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:961 
Thus, until the decision in Gully, the only jurisdictional bright-line 
rule the Court had endorsed was the well-pleaded complaint rule, and the 
Court’s jurisprudence drew no distinction between claims created by 
federal law and state-law claims that included an essential federal 
ingredient. That aside, the law of federal question jurisdiction was 
governed by a claim-centered, arising-under jurisdictional theory that 
focused on the nature of the claim and the role that federal law played 
within that claim. 
Given the lyrical language of the Gully opinion, one might be tempted 
to think that the standard is open-ended and indeterminate. But that is far 
from the case. In fact, Gully offers clear guidance as to the key question 
that should inform the arising-under jurisdiction analysis. That question 
asks whether the “right or immunity [is] such that it will be supported if 
the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction 
or effect, and defeated if they receive another.”145 In other words, the 
goal is to determine whether resolution of the plaintiff’s claim turns on a 
question of federal law. This test, although precise in its focus, is not 
mechanical since it realistically acknowledges the kaleidoscopic range of 
possibilities in which such a federal question might arise. 
Gully can be seen as a nearly perfect exemplar of both the classic and 
modified versions of legal process as previously described. In terms of 
the principle of institutional settlement, the opinion assigns courts a role 
that is appropriate and consistent with congressional intent, namely the 
determination of whether a particular claim falls within the broad sweep 
of jurisdiction vested in the federal courts by the Constitution and by 
Congress. Certainly one gets no sense that Gully invites the judiciary to 
engage in anything but a legitimate judicial function. Further, Gully 
cannot be described as formalistic in any sense. Rather, it invites a 
flexible but principled assessment of jurisdiction that cannot be 
measured by any simple bright-line or mechanical rule, but that should 
nonetheless lead to results that are premised on predictable and 
nonsubjective questions and conclusions. By focusing its attention on 
the claim, the Gully Court establishes a principle that respects the 
individual claims of right. This approach is consistent with the full range 
of structural concerns that animate the Constitution, including a balanced 
approach to federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. 
Finally, the analysis is premised on a rational explanation of a durable 
legal principle—one that had been used effectively for at least sixty 
years before Gully—that focuses on the nature of the claim. 
145. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112. 
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III. THE MECHANICAL APPROACH TO ARISING-UNDER 
JURISDICTION 
As explained earlier, one of the critical factors in the legal process 
method is the requirement of reasoned elaboration.146 And as Professor 
Fallon pointed out, the legal process scholarly agenda requires a careful 
examination and critique of doctrine.147 Thus, the following discussion 
provides a relatively detailed examination of five major cases, all of 
which stray from the legal process path in one way or another, and all of 
which suffer from a lack of reasoned elaboration. 
A. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust 
Gully remained the foundational federal question case for several 
decades, without any apparent deviation from the approach it 
endorsed.148 Indeed, it has been cited and relied on by the Supreme 
Court and lower courts up to the present time.149 However, the Supreme 
Court’s approach to federal question jurisdiction began to diverge from 
Gully’s path in 1983 with the decision in Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.150 There, the California 
Franchise Tax Board sought a levy on funds held in trust for three 
construction workers by the Construction Laborers Vacation Trust 
(CLVT).151 The Tax Board claimed a right to the funds based on the 
members’ failure to pay the state income tax.152 When the trustee refused 
to meet the Tax Board’s demands, the Tax Board filed an action in 
California state court seeking damages for the amount of the taxes owed 
and a declaration that its right to those funds was not preempted by the 
federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
147. Fallon, supra note 24, at 977.  
148. See, e.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 128 (1974); Oneida Indian 
Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 
U.S. 667, 672 (1950); see also PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT 
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 884 (2d ed. 
1973); JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES 
AND MATERIALS 190 (2d ed. 1974). 
149. E.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 78 (2009); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. 
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321 (2005); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800, 808 (1988); Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 820 (1986) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
150. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
151. Id. at 5–6. 
152. Id. at 6. 
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(ERISA).153 CLVT removed the case to federal court on the theory that 
the plaintiff’s action for declaratory relief arose under federal law.154 
The plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the trial court denied, 
ruling that ERISA did not preempt the State’s claims.155 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed on the jurisdictional question, but reversed on the 
merits.156 On certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed only the 
jurisdictional issue.157 
The Court’s jurisdictional inquiry focused largely on the claim for 
declaratory relief. As the Court explained, the decision in Skelly Oil Co. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co.158 had held that the Federal Declaratory 
Judgment Act did not expand the scope of federal arising-under 
jurisdiction.159 Although the immediate action was filed under the 
California Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court ruled that the standard 
applicable under Skelly Oil would also apply to actions filed under state 
declaratory judgment statutes.160 Under Skelly Oil, federal question 
jurisdiction is satisfied only if one of the parties to the declaratory relief 
action could have filed a coercive suit against the opposing party that 
itself would arise under federal law consistent with the well-pleaded 
complaint rule.161 Hence, if the party filing for declaratory relief does no 
more than seek a declaration that its claimed right is not preempted by 
federal law, the case does not arise under federal law for purposes of 
§ 1331, since, in a suit by that party to enforce that right, the federal 
preemption question would be raised by the defendant as a defense to the 
action.162 But if the declaratory judgment defendant would have a 
coercive federal preemption claim against the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff,163 then the case will in fact arise under federal law.164 
Although the Tax Board’s claim for declaratory relief did seek a 
153. Id. at 5–7. 
154. Id. at 7–8. 
155. Id.  
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
159. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 15–17. 
160. Id. at 18–19. 
161. Id. at 19. 
162. Id. at 16. 
163. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
164. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 (“Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction 
over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive 
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.”). 
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declaration that federal law did not preempt its claim,165 there was 
something more to the case. As the Court explained, “[f]ederal courts 
have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits 
in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive 
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal 
question.”166 The Court then noted that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA 
specifically granted “trustees of ERISA-covered plans like CLVT a 
cause of action for injunctive relief when their rights and duties under 
ERISA are at issue.”167 Having so noted, the Court asked whether the 
Tax Board’s claim for declaratory relief arose under federal law.168 
Given that CLVT had a claim for coercive relief under ERISA—a claim 
that was the mirror image of the Tax Board’s “defensive” claim for 
declaratory relief—the obvious answer would seem to be “yes.” 
The Court, however, concluded that jurisdiction was lacking: 
We have always interpreted what Skelly Oil called “the current 
of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875,” 
with an eye to practicality and necessity . . . . There are good 
reasons why the federal courts should not entertain suits by the 
States to declare the validity of their regulations despite possibly 
conflicting federal law. States are not significantly prejudiced by 
an inability to come to federal court for a declaratory judgment 
in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a person subject to 
federal regulation. They have a variety of means by which they 
can enforce their own laws in their own courts, and they do not 
suffer if the preemption questions such enforcement may raise 
are tested there. The express grant of federal jurisdiction in 
ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties as to whom 
Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal 
court was necessary to further the statute’s purposes. It did not 
go so far as to provide that any suit against such parties must 
also be brought in federal court when they themselves did not 
choose to sue.169 
165. Id. at 6–7. 
166. Id. at 19. 
167. Id. at 19–20. 
168. Id. at 20. 
169. Id. at 20–21 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 27 
(“Nevertheless, CLVT’s argument that appellant’s second cause of action arises under ERISA fails 
for the second reason given above. ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief 
under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an 
express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief 
by some other party does not ‘arise under’ that provision.”). 
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The Court also held that the Tax Board’s suit to enforce tax levies was 
not subject to the complete preemption doctrine, since such tax 
proceedings were “not of central concern” to ERISA.170 
While the Court’s introductory discussion of the law of federal 
question jurisdiction suggested a relatively traditional approach to the 
topic, the Court’s application of the traditional standards was novel to 
say the least. Clearly, CLVT qualified as a declaratory judgment 
defendant with a coercive claim that presented a substantial federal 
question, namely, whether the State’s action was preempted by ERISA. 
Thus, under Skelly Oil, and as the Court itself had just explained,171 the 
case presented a substantial federal issue consistent with the well-
pleaded complaint rule as applied in actions for declaratory relief. 
However, the Court’s analysis ignored this factor and instead took a 
surprising turn driven by the open-ended policy considerations of 
“practicality and necessity.”172 The immediately preceding block 
quotation173 provides the Court’s entire discussion of the relevant policy. 
Essentially, the Court reasoned that federal jurisdiction was lacking 
since the State could vindicate its rights in state court and since Congress 
had not expressly given the State access to the federal forum.174 The fact 
that Congress clearly wanted ERISA-preemption claims litigated in 
federal courts seemed irrelevant. Nor did the Court credit the fact that 
Congress had vested parties such as CLVT with a right to a federal 
forum. 
Judged against the classic and modified legal process method, the 
Franchise Tax Board opinion is deficient in several respects. As already 
noted, it abandoned a well-established and durable principle in service of 
a vague policy judgment seemingly designed to resolve the specific case 
before it. In addition, the Court’s opinion betrayed the principle of 
reasoned elaboration given the empty space that fell between the Court’s 
description of arising-under standards and the Court’s ultimate and 
inexplicable conclusion that those standards had not been satisfied. 
Finally, the Court denied jurisdiction in the face of clear congressional 
intent to the contrary, and in violation of the principles of institutional 
settlement and separation of powers. 
170. Id. at 25–26. 
171. Id. at 20–21. 
172. See id. at 20. 
173. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
174. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21. 
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B. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson 
In 1986, the Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. 
Thompson175 took Franchise Tax Board’s “practicality and necessity”176 
approach a step further. There, two sets of parents, residents of Canada 
and Scotland, respectively, sued Merrell Dow, a drug manufacturer, 
claiming that their children had suffered birth defects caused by a drug 
manufactured by the defendant and ingested by the mothers while 
pregnant.177 The suit was filed in an Ohio state court and removed to 
federal court by the defendant.178 The defendant argued that the case 
arose under federal law because one of the six claims asserted by the 
plaintiffs relied on an alleged violation of the labeling standard imposed 
by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the violation of 
which was said to create a presumption of negligence under state law.179 
The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand arguing that no federal question 
was presented in their suit.180 The defendants responded by filing a 
motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.181 The district 
court denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand but granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.182 The court of appeals, addressing only the 
jurisdictional issue, reversed in a one-page opinion, concluding that 
federal law was not necessarily implicated in the plaintiffs’ suit and that, 
as a consequence, the case did not arise under federal law.183 The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs’ claim 
arose under federal law for purposes of § 1331.184 
Adopting the policy-driven approach endorsed by the Court three 
years earlier in Franchise Tax Board,185 the focus of the majority 
opinion was less on the nature of the action, as had been the focus of the 
court of appeals, and more on the “dictates of sound judicial policy” that, 
in the majority’s view, should justify the exercise of federal 
175. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
176. See 463 U.S. at 20. 
177. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805–06. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. Although alienage jurisdiction was satisfied under § 1332(a)(2), the case could not be 
removed under § 1441 since Merrell Dow was a resident of the forum state. Id. at 806 n.1; see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). 
180. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1985). 
184. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810. 
185. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20 (1983). 
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jurisdiction.186 Thus, according to the Court, the “‘increased complexity 
of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation,’ as 
well as ‘the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent,’” 
were key considerations that should be taken into account in determining 
whether a case satisfied the arising-under standard.187 
In concluding that there was no federal question jurisdiction in this 
case, the most significant factor to the Court, however, was the untested 
assumption that Congress had not intended to create a private right of 
action to enforce the FDCA.188 From this assumption, the Court further 
assumed that Congress also intended to preclude the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction over state law claims premised on a violation of an FDCA 
standard.189 In response to the petitioner’s argument that the claim 
included a substantial federal question,190 the Court replied that the 
absence of a congressionally created private right of action was 
“tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed 
violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is 
insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”191 
Thus, in Merrell Dow, a judicially imposed policy judgment, driven 
by case-management concerns and mechanically applied, operated as a 
determinative measure of substantiality. In fact, the Court attributed a 
variety of meanings to the word “substantial,” further enhancing the 
scope of its discretion to reject federal jurisdiction in these cases. 
“Substantial,” said the Court, could connote meaningfulness within the 
context of the pending case,192 importance to the federal system in a way 
186. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810 (quoting Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 
354, 379 (1959)). 
187. Id. at 811–12 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 
377 (1982)).  
188. Id. at 812. 
189. Id. 
190. The petitioner contended that “the case represents a straightforward application of the 
statement in Franchise Tax Board that federal-question jurisdiction is appropriate when ‘it appears 
that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-
pleaded state claims.’” Id. at 813 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13). 
191. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814. 
192. Id. at 814 n.12 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569–70 (1912)) (“A suit to 
enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that 
reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and 
substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such 
a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. This is especially so of a suit involving 
rights to land acquired under a law of the United States. If it were not, every suit to establish title to 
land in the central and western States would so arise, as all titles in those States are traceable back to 
those laws[.]”). 
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that transcended the pending case,193 or non-frivolousness as a matter of 
substantive law.194 The federal issue presented in Merrell Dow was 
insubstantial under any of these standards, and proof of that 
insubstantiality required no resort to the Court’s newly crafted policy 
judgment. Instead, the Court could have asked and answered a simple 
question: Was the case one that was truly about federal law? 
In order to answer this question, a little background might be helpful. 
The lawyer who represented the two sets of parents in Merrell Dow had 
previously filed a virtually identical suit against the company in the 
same federal district court, invoking that court’s diversity jurisdiction, 
but representing different (also foreign) plaintiffs.195 The district court 
dismissed that case on forum non conveniens grounds.196 The lawyer, 
with new foreign clients in hand, then sued Merrell Dow in an Ohio state 
court asserting essentially the same claims.197 Merrell Dow, quite 
plainly, wanted this new iteration of the case in the same federal court 
that had earlier dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Since 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) precluded removal on diversity grounds198—Merrell 
Dow being a citizen of Ohio for purposes of diversity—the only 
possibility was removal as a federal question case. So the fight over 
jurisdiction was really a fight over forum non conveniens. 
The focus on forum non conveniens helps explain why the 
plaintiffs—who invoked federal law in their complaint—argued against 
jurisdiction, while the defendant—who denied the legitimacy of their 
“federal claim”—argued that federal question jurisdiction was satisfied. 
It is true that the plaintiffs’ complaints raised a potential violation of the 
FDCA, but what is not apparent from the Merrell Dow decision is that 
the federal issue was frivolous from the outset, and more a product of the 
imagination of the lawyers representing Merrell Dow than anything else. 
The text of the FDCA addresses itself to interstate and intrastate 
transactions. It does not (at least on its face) purport to apply to drugs 
manufactured and sold outside the United States. The drugs at issue in 
193. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (“We simply conclude that the congressional determination 
that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a 
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a 
state cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”). 
194. Id. at 817 (“Although it is true that federal jurisdiction cannot be based on a frivolous or 
insubstantial federal question . . . .”). 
195. See In re Richardson-Merrell Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1130–32 (S.D. Ohio 1982).  
196. Id. at 1136–37. 
197. See Chambers v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., No. C-850888, 1986 WL 14901, at *1 (Ohio 
App. Dec. 24, 1986). 
198. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805 n.1. 
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Merrell Dow were, in fact, manufactured and sold outside the United 
States (though that was not revealed on the face of the complaint).199 
Merrell Dow nonetheless argued that the case presented a significant 
question of whether the FDCA applied beyond the U.S. borders.200 But 
the plaintiffs had made no such claim; rather, their complaints seemed to 
be based on the prayer that no one would notice that the statutory 
standard they invoked was inapplicable under the circumstances 
presented. 
Returning to the question of whether this was a case that could be 
heard by a federal court, the dissent, authored by Justice Brennan,201 
questioned the logic of the majority’s reasoning. “Why,” the dissent 
asked, “should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private 
federal remedy mean that Congress would not want there to be federal 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes liability for violating 
the federal law?”202 As the dissent saw it, the decision not to provide a 
private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the 
reasons Congress withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for 
withholding federal jurisdiction.203 In the dissent’s view, the majority 
had not even considered that question.204 
As to the last point, the dissent observed that Congress had vested 
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over administrative actions 
arising under the FDCA, strongly suggesting that the exercise of 
jurisdiction in cases such as this would be consistent with congressional 
intent as to the proper scope of federal question jurisdiction.205 The 
dissent’s explanation is worth a close reading: 
Congress passes laws in order to shape behavior; a federal law 
expresses Congress’ determination that there is a federal interest in 
having individuals or other entities conform their actions to a particular 
norm established by that law . . . . It is the duty of courts to interpret 
these laws and apply them in such a way that the congressional purpose 
is realized. As noted above, Congress granted the district courts power to 
hear cases “arising under” federal law in order to enhance the likelihood 
that federal laws would be interpreted more correctly and applied more 
199. Brief for Petitioner at 6–7, Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) 
(No. 85-619).  
200. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 816–17. 
201. Id. at 818. 
202. Id. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 830. 
205. Id. at 831. 
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uniformly. In other words, Congress determined that the availability of a 
federal forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions would 
make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in the way 
that Congress intended. 
By making federal law an essential element of a state-law claim, the 
State places the federal law into a context where it will operate to shape 
behavior: the threat of liability will force individuals to conform their 
conduct to interpretations of the federal law made by courts adjudicating 
the state-law claim . . . . Consequently, the possibility that the federal 
law will be incorrectly interpreted in the context of adjudicating the 
state-law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the 
district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal questions in 
precisely the same way as if it was federal law that “created” the cause 
of action. It therefore follows that there is federal jurisdiction under 
§ 1331.206 
The views of the dissent are well taken. The majority opinion 
replaced the fundamental inquiry into the nature of the federal issue and 
the role of that issue within that lawsuit with an abstract policy judgment 
based on a presumed congressional intent. The dissent, on the other 
hand, returned the analysis to durable principles of general applicability, 
more consistent with Gully and with the Court’s obligation to exercise 
the jurisdiction intentionally vested in it by Congress—and thus more in 
line with legal process. 
C. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. 
In 1988, the Court added another consideration to the arising-under 
analysis. In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,207 the 
plaintiff sued his former employer in a federal court, claiming violations 
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and state law tortious 
interference with his business relationships.208 The defendant responded 
by arguing that its conduct was justified by a need to protect its trade 
secrets and by filing a variety of counterclaims based on the plaintiff’s 
alleged misappropriation of one of defendant’s patent specifications.209 
The precise question before the Supreme Court was whether either the 
Seventh Circuit or the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction over this 
206. Id. at 827–28. 
207. 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
208. Id. at 805. 
209. Id. at 805–06. 
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case.210 The answer to that question depended on whether the case arose 
under patent law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338, for if it did, 
then appellate jurisdiction would lie exclusively in the Federal Circuit.211 
The Court held that the case was not one arising under patent law since 
the plaintiff’s antitrust claim rested on two theories, only one of which 
relied on patent law.212 In adopting this “alternative theories” approach 
to arising-under jurisdiction, the Court relied on language from its 
decision in Franchise Tax Board: 
If “on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are . . . reasons 
completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent laws] 
why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it 
seeks,” . . . then the claim does not “arise under” those laws.213 
The Christianson Court further limited the scope of federal question 
jurisdiction by adding yet another mechanical test—specifically, the 
alternative theories test.214 In adopting this approach, the Court did not 
define or even consider the difference between separate claims, separate 
theories on the same claim, and the possibility of having original 
jurisdiction over some claims (and/or theories) and supplemental 
jurisdiction over others. Moreover, the Court’s reliance on Franchise 
Tax Board as establishing an alternative-theories test was completely 
misplaced, since the Court in Franchise Tax Board neither adopted nor 
alluded to any such test. Rather, the language from Franchise Tax Board 
that the Christianson Court relied on was simply used as an explanation 
as to why the complete preemption doctrine did not apply to that case.215 
This obvious misreading of a precedent certainly flies in the face of the 
210. Id. at 803–04, 806–07. 
211. Id. at 807. 
212. Id. at 810–12. 
213. Id. at 810 (alterations in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)). 
214. The Court, indeed, explained that “arising under” means precisely the same thing under 
§ 1331 and § 1338. 486 U.S. at 808–09. 
215. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1983) (“Against this background, it is clear that a 
suit by state tax authorities under a statute like § 18818 does not “arise under” ERISA. Unlike the 
contract rights at issue in Avco, the State’s right to enforce its tax levies is not of central concern to 
the federal statute. For that reason, as in Gully, on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are 
many reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of ERISA why the State may or 
may not be entitled to the relief it seeks. Furthermore, ERISA does not provide an alternative cause 
of action in favor of the State to enforce its rights, while § 301 expressly supplied the plaintiff in 
Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its preempted state contract claim. Therefore, even 
though the Court of Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes enforcement of the State’s 
levy in the circumstances of this case, an action to enforce the levy is not itself preempted by 
ERISA.”) (citation omitted). 
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principle of reasoned elaboration. 
The combination of Franchise Tax Board, Merrell Dow, and 
Christianson fragmented the jurisdictional inquiry and abandoned the 
principled approach endorsed in Gully and its predecessors. In so doing, 
the Court made it increasingly difficult to honor the institutional 
authority of Congress to vest federal courts with general arising-under 
jurisdiction. 
In deciding these cases, the Court had clearly strayed from the path 
set by Gully. Practicality and necessity, speculation about an ersatz 
congressional intent, and mechanical tests had come to replace the 
fundamental inquiry into the federal nature of the plaintiff’s claim. In 
this sense, the Court’s emerging jurisprudence sacrificed the interest of 
the individual in service of the interest of the federal judicial system. At 
the same time, the Court was slowly developing a doctrine that would 
give federal judges a potential veto over cases that would otherwise have 
fallen within their arising-under jurisdiction. 
Merrell Dow, in addition to abandoning Gully, generated a major 
conflict among the lower federal courts. Circuit courts split on the 
critical question of whether federal courts could exercise federal 
jurisdiction on state-law claims that include an essential federal 
ingredient in the absence of an express or implied right of action to 
enforce the federal standard.216 The Court finally granted certiorari in 
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing217 in an effort to resolve this conflict.218 
D. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing 
In Grable, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seized real property 
owned by Grable to satisfy Grable’s federal tax delinquency.219 The IRS 
gave Grable notice of the seizure by certified mail and Grable received 
216. Compare Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 304–05 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding arising-under 
jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act despite absence of private right of action), 
Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430, 431 (4th Cir. 1986) (accord), McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 
1477 (11th Cir. 1986), (accord), and Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1140–41 (5th Cir. 
1985) (accord), with Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 694–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arriving at the 
opposite conclusion post-Merrell Dow). See also Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 
806–07 (4th Cir. 1996) (no private right of action required to establish federal ingredient jurisdiction 
post-Merrell Dow). But see Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (private right of 
action required to establish federal ingredient jurisdiction post-Merrell Dow). 
217. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
218. Id. at 311–12 & n.2. 
219. Id. at 310. 
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actual notice.220 After the property was sold to Darue, Grable did not 
exercise its statutory right to redeem it.221 Five years later, Grable sued 
Darue in a quiet title action in a state court claiming that Darue’s title 
“was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of 
the property in the exact manner required by [26 U.S.C.] § 6335(a).”222 
That section provided that written notice had to be “given by the 
Secretary to the owner of the property . . . [or] left at his usual place of 
abode or business.”223 The defendant removed the case to federal court 
asserting jurisdiction under § 1331 since the quiet-title claim depended 
on the interpretation and application of the federal notice statute.224 The 
district court denied Grable’s motion to remand and a judgment was 
entered for Darue, the court having concluded that the notice given to 
Grable was in “substantial compliance” with § 6335(a).225 The court of 
appeals affirmed.226 
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the state-
created quiet title claim contained a federal ingredient sufficient to 
justify the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.227 The Court 
explained that the mere presence of a federal ingredient in a state law 
claim is not itself sufficient to satisfy the statutory “arising-under” 
standard.228 Rather, “the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily 
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a 
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally 
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”229 
In adopting this four-part test, the Court also made it clear that 
Merrell Dow was not to be read as requiring a private right of action in 
order to establish “arising under” jurisdiction.230 While it thus aligned 
itself with the lower courts that had similarly held, the Grable Court did 
not return to Gully’s durable principle. Instead, it remained focused on 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 310–311. 
222. Id. at 311. 
223. 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2000). 
224. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 310–11. 
228. Id. at 313. 
229. Id. at 314. 
230. In the Court’s words, “[a]ccordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating 
the absence of a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the 
‘sensitive judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.” Id. at 318 (quoting Merrell 
Dow Pharms. Inc., v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)). 
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the details of a doctrine that seems designed to serve the federal 
judiciary’s interest at the expense of the legitimate interests of individual 
claimants in choosing a federal forum. 
Applying its four-part test to the case before it, the Court found that 
Grable’s claim was one arising under federal law. First, the adequacy of 
notice under the terms of a federal statute was an essential element of the 
plaintiff’s claim.231 Second, the meaning of the federal statute was 
actually disputed between the parties.232 Third, the issue was substantial 
due to the federal government’s interests in the collection of taxes, the 
marketability of the title to property sold in tax delinquency sales, and 
the availability of a federal forum “to vindicate its administrative 
action.”233 Finally, the Court saw no threat to the congressionally 
approved balance between federal and state court jurisdiction since it 
would “be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal 
law.”234 
While Grable eliminated the conflicts caused by Merrell Dow with 
respect to the role of the private right of action in the determination of 
arising-under jurisdiction, it did nothing to clarify Merrell Dow’s 
multiple usages of the word “substantial,” for it did precisely the same 
thing—varying the meaning of substantial between important to the 
pending litigation,235 and important in a way that transcended that 
litigation.236 In addition, the Grable Court endorsed and amplified the 
policy-driven approach introduced by the Court in Franchise Tax Board, 
and thus made the potential veto into an integral component of the 
arising-under analysis.237 This component, which ostensibly focuses on 
the presumed intent of a silent Congress, cannot be measured other than 
through a collective assessment of the ad hoc judgment of the courts that 
apply it. 
The inconsistency between the Grable approach, on the one hand, and 
the classic and modified legal process method on the other, is palpable. 
The veto principle is neither durable nor of general application, as it 
calls for ad hoc determinations while providing no guidance as to how 
those determinations should be made. It is also inconsistent with the 
separation of powers principle since it allows courts to ignore the actual 
231. Id. at 315. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 310, 312. 
236. Id. at 315. 
237. See id. at 313–14. 
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intent of Congress. 
E. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh 
The arising-under saga continued in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, 
Inc. v. McVeigh,238 where a private healthcare provider for federal 
employees brought an action against a former enrollee’s estate, seeking 
reimbursement of insurance benefits on the ground that the enrollee had 
recovered damages for his injuries in a state-court tort action.239 The 
question presented was whether the action for reimbursement arose 
under federal law for purposes of § 1331.240 The plan itself was subject 
to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA) and 
was a product of negotiations with a federal agency.241 However, neither 
FEHBA nor any federal regulation addressed the question of 
reimbursement, nor was there any dispute as to the interpretation of any 
federal statute or rule on which the healthcare provider’s contractually 
based reimbursement claim depended.242 Nonetheless, the suit was filed 
in federal court invoking § 1331 jurisdiction.243 The district court 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and the Second Circuit affirmed.244 
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed.245 It first held that neither 
federal common law246 nor FEHBA created a cause of action for 
reimbursement.247 Indeed, the Court’s discussion of these questions 
strongly suggested that the plaintiff’s reimbursement claim presented no 
federal issue whatsoever.248 Nonetheless, the Court proceeded (or 
purported) to apply Grable’s four-part test,249 premised on the caveat 
that it designed this test to reach only a “special and small category” of 
cases.250 
238. 547 U.S. 677 (2006). 
239. Id. at 682–83. 
240. Id. at 683. 
241. Id. at 683–84. 
242. Id. at 683. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 688. 
245. Id. at 701. 
246. Id. at 691–93. 
247. Id. at 693–99. 
248. See id. at 690–99 (strongly suggesting that neither federal common law nor FEHBA were in 
any manner implicated by plaintiff’s claim). 
249. See supra text accompanying note 229. 
250. McVeigh, 547 U.S. at 699. 
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The Court did not address the first or second prongs of the Grable 
test, which is to say that the Court neither identified a federal ingredient 
embedded in plaintiff’s reimbursement claim nor described any dispute 
over the meaning, application or validity of any such ingredient. Instead, 
the Court began by observing that the case before it was “poles apart 
from Grable.“251 There were, in the Court’s view, two key distinctions. 
First, because the dispute in Grable “centered on the action of a federal 
agency (IRS) and its compatibility with a federal statute, the question 
qualified as ‘substantial’ . . . .”252 By way of contrast, plaintiff’s 
“reimbursement claim was triggered, not by the action of any federal 
department, agency, or service, but by the settlement of a personal-injury 
action launched in state court . . . .”253 Second, “Grable presented a 
nearly ‘pure issue of law,’ one ‘that could be settled once and for all and 
thereafter would govern numerous tax sale cases.’”254 By way of 
contrast, “Empire’s reimbursement claim . . . [was] fact-bound and 
situation-specific.”255 Given these distinctions, the Court concluded that 
the case did not arise under federal law.256 
The approach adopted by the Empire Court raises three distinct 
problems. First, as a general matter, the Empire Court’s treatment of the 
specific facts of Grable as suggesting additional doctrinal limitations on 
the scope of federal-ingredient jurisdiction misperceives the role of the 
facts in the development of the law and confuses the particular 
application of a rule with the rule itself. Certainly, the absence of a 
federal agency in the background of the case has no necessary bearing 
on the substantiality of the federal issue presented. Second, given that 
the category of federal question cases is inherently “special and 
small,”257 the inclusion of that phrase suggests another unprincipled 
contraction of the federal-ingredient category further disserving the 
intent of Congress. On what principled ground, and by whose authority, 
must that category be small? Finally, the distinction drawn by the Court 
between pure questions of law and questions of fact fails to recognize 
the important role of federal courts as finders of fact in vindicating 
federal rights and obligations. As the Court had previously observed in 
251. Id. at 700. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (Supp. 2005)). 
255. Id. at 700–01. 
256. Id. at 701. 
257. Id. at 699. 
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England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,258 fact-finding 
is a critical component of a federal district court’s exercise of federal 
question jurisdiction: 
Limiting the litigant to review here would deny him the benefit 
of a federal trial court’s role in constructing a record and making 
fact findings. How the facts are found will often dictate the 
decision of federal claims. It is the typical, not the rare, case in 
which constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested 
factual issues. There is always in litigation a margin of error, 
representing error in fact-finding.”259 
It is also fair to say that Empire failed to satisfy the reasoned elaboration 
principle in that the Court’s discussion has virtually nothing to do with 
resolving the federal question before it. The discussion wanders into 
arising-under law when no such journey was required by the claims 
presented to it. Instead, all that the Court had to do was rule that no 
federal question was presented in the case, or on that basis dismiss the 
petition on the ground that certiorari was improvidently granted. 
F. Grable and Empire in the Lower Federal Courts 
In the wake of Grable and Empire, lower federal courts have 
struggled to develop a coherent approach to what they perceive as the 
mandate of the Grable/Empire test.260 At least one circuit has created its 
own multi-factor test as a method of navigating the Grable/Empire 
standard.261 Others have attempted to avoid the full implications of that 
258. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
259. Id. at 416–17 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Osborn v. Bank of 
the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 821–23 (1824) (“A cause may depend on several questions of fact and 
law. . . . [I]f the circumstance that other points are involved in it, shall disable Congress from 
authorizing the Courts of the Union to take jurisdiction of the original cause, it equally disables 
Congress from authorizing those Courts to take jurisdiction of the whole cause, on an appeal, and 
thus will be restricted to a single question in that cause; and words obviously intended to secure to 
those who claim rights under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, a trial in the 
federal Courts, will be restricted to the insecure remedy of an appeal upon an insulated point, after it 
has received that shape which may be given to it by another tribunal, into which he is forced against 
his will.”); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” 
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV., 890, 892–93 (1967); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 
“Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 170–72 (1953). 
260. For a rare case in which all of the Grable and Empire factors seem to have been satisfied, 
see Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2012). 
261. Thus, in Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 553 U.S. 1031 (2008), the court adopted a four-part test to measure the Grable substantiality 
prong: (1) whether the case includes a federal agency, and particularly, whether that agency’s 
compliance with the federal statute is in dispute; (2) whether the federal question is important (i.e., 
not trivial); (3) whether a decision on the federal question will resolve the case (i.e., the federal 
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standard by compressing the Grable four-part test into something that 
resembles the Gully standard.262 In essence, lower courts are creating 
tests to measure the Grable/Empire test. 
The variable approach to Grable’s substantiality prong is particularly 
telling. Although the Grable Court focused much of its substantiality 
analysis on whether the federal issue was dear to the federal system, 
lower federal courts have not approached this issue uniformly. Some 
have followed Grable strictly, completely ignoring the importance of the 
role of the federal issue in the pending litigation.263 Others continue to 
consider the significance of the federal issue to the pending litigation,264 
and some also attend to the independent importance (or unimportance) 
of the federal issue presented.265 In addition, some courts consider the 
absence of a federal agency in the case as being a significant limiting 
factor on the question of substantiality.266 Others require that the federal 
issue present an almost pure question of law, implicitly discarding the 
important fact-finding role of federal courts.267 Similarly, some lower 
courts have demanded that resolution of the federal issue be applicable 
to a broad range of future cases.268 In addition, several lower courts have 
enforced the alternative-theory principle elaborated in Christianson,269 
while others have advised that “jurisdiction is disfavored for cases 
question is not merely incidental to the outcome); and (4) whether a decision as to the federal 
question will control numerous other cases (i.e., the issue is not anomalous or isolated). Id. at 570. 
262. See Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1284–86 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 
1271–73 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
263. E.g., McCormick v. Excel Corp., 413 F. Supp. 2d 967, 969–70 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
264. E.g., N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. WellCare of N.Y., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
265. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1284–86; Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271–73; Dixon v. 
Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 818 (4th Cir. 2004); Bowdrie v. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd., 909 F. 
Supp. 2d 179, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Eli Lilly & Co., 476 F. Supp. 
2d 230, 233–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Beechwood Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Konersman, 517 F. Supp. 2d 770, 
775 (D.S.C. 2007). 
266. Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160, 1174 (10th Cir. 2012). 
267. Id.; Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Alade v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., 
Inc., No. 4:12-CV-497 CAS, 2012 WL 2598091, at *4 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Yellen v. Teledne Cont’l 
Motors, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497–98 (E.D. Pa. 2011); McAdams v. Medtronic, Inc., No. H-
10-831, 2010 WL 3909958, at *2–4 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
268. Alade, 2012 WL 2598091, at *4; Yellen, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 497–98; McAdams, 2010 WL 
3909958, at *3–4; Alcarmen v. Citibank N.A., No. C–09–0853 EMC, 2009 WL 1330803, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. 2009). 
269. Whittington v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, No. 1:12CV112, 2012 WL 4846484, at *4 
(W.D.N.C. 2012); In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Blakenship v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 886, 898 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
 
                                                     
07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013 5:11 PM 
1004 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:961 
that . . . involve substantial questions of state as well as federal law.”270 
Finally, some lower courts have treated Empire’s admonition that cases 
satisfying the Grable standard should represent a “special and small 
category” as creating an additional presumption against the exercise of 
federal question jurisdiction.271 Taking all of these approaches together, 
and considering their inherent malleability, the law of federal question 
jurisdiction has become anything but principled and seemingly rests 
within the hands of each individual federal court judge. 
In short, Gully’s elegant compass, with its point pinned on the “true 
north” of congressional intent and the role played by the federal issue in 
the claim presented, has been replaced by a maze of multi-pronged tests 
that mask the essential inquiry with the rhetoric of policy, pragmatics, 
ersatz intent, speculation, and ever-expanding multi-prong tests. 
IV. GUNN V. MINTON: A CASE STUDY 
We now come to Gunn v. Minton,272 the Supreme Court’s latest foray 
into the thicket of arising-under jurisdiction. At the very least, Gunn 
provided the Court an opportunity to clarify the confusion generated by 
its most recent federal-ingredient decisions; at its very best, Gunn 
offered the Court an opportunity to return jurisdictional analysis to its 
principled roots. The Court chose a different path. 
Vernon Minton filed a federal patent infringement action (the “Patent 
Litigation”) against the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(the “NASD”), assisted by attorney Jerry W. Gunn and other lawyers.273 
Minton alleged that the NASD had infringed his U.S. patent for 
TEXCEN, a telecommunications network and software program.274 
Minton’s company had leased TEXCEN to R.M. Stark & Co. (“Stark”) 
more than one year before he applied for the patent for that invention.275 
At the time of the lease, Minton assured Stark that TEXCEN was a 
finished product and never suggested that the purpose of the lease was 
270. E.g., Bender 623 F.3d at 1130. 
271. Gilmore, 694 F.3d at 1171; Alade, 2012 WL 2598091, at *4; Yellen, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 497; 
Baum v. Keystone Mercy Health Plan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 718, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011); McAdams, 2010 
WL 3909958, at *2; J. Kaz, Inc. v. Brown, No. 10-0382, 2010 WL 2024483, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2010); 
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2008 WL 5450351, at *4 (S.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
272. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
273. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 3, Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 
11-1118). 
274. Id. at 3–4. 
275. Id. at 4. 
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experimentation.276 NASD moved for summary judgment arguing that 
the technology that formed the basis of Minton’s patent had been the 
subject of a commercial lease—the lease to Stark—more than a year 
before Minton applied for the patent.277 According to NASD, the “on 
sale bar” would thus apply and preclude Minton from acquiring a patent 
on the technology.278 The district court granted NASD’s summary 
judgment motion.279 Minton’s attorneys then filed a motion for 
reconsideration, raising the new argument that the “experimental use” 
negated the “on sale bar.”280 The district court, however, denied 
reconsideration.281 Minton appealed and the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s judgment.282 
Minton then filed a legal malpractice suit before a Texas state court 
against Gunn and the attorneys who represented Minton in the Patent 
Litigation.283 He alleged that, by failing to raise the experimental use 
doctrine in a timely fashion, his lawyers had been negligent and caused 
him to lose the case.284 The lawyer defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment, challenging the causation element of Minton’s 
malpractice claim.285 They argued that the experimental use exception 
did not apply to the commercial lease at issue and that their alleged 
failure to timely plead and brief the exception therefore could not have 
caused Minton any harm.286 The trial court granted the defendants’ 
summary judgment motions and entered a take-nothing judgment on all 
Minton’s claims.287 Minton appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second District of Texas.288 While that appeal was pending, the Federal 
Circuit decided Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.289 and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 5. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 5–6. 
287. Id. at 6. 
288. Id. 
289. 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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Jaworski, LLP,290 each of which addressed the precise question 
presented in Gunn v. Minton. 
In Air Measurement, the question was whether a state-created legal 
malpractice case for negligent representation in a previous patent 
prosecution and litigation could be removed to federal court as a suit 
arising under the patent laws within the meaning of § 1338.291 The 
Federal Circuit relied on the Grable test and held that removal was 
proper.292 First, the court found that the patent law issue was embedded 
in the malpractice claim since proof of patent infringement was a 
necessary element of the plaintiff’s malpractice claim.293 Next, since the 
parties disagreed on the question of patent infringement, the court easily 
concluded that the infringement question was actually disputed.294 Third, 
the court concluded that the patent infringement question was 
substantial, citing three reasons—because it was “a necessary element of 
the malpractice case,”295 “because patents are issued by a federal 
agency,”296 and because litigants will benefit “from federal judges who 
have experience in claim construction and infringement matters.”297 
Finally, as to the last Grable prong, the court found that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would be consistent with the congressionally mandated 
balance of jurisdiction between state and federal courts, explaining, 
“Congress considered the federal-state division of labor and struck a 
balance in favor of this court’s entertaining patent infringement. For us 
to conclude otherwise would undermine Congress’s expectation.”298 
The Immunocept case,299 decided by the Federal Circuit on the same 
day as Air Measurement, involved another patent-based legal 
malpractice claim. The court again found arising-under jurisdiction 
satisfied.300 As was true in Air Measurement, the plaintiff’s malpractice 
claim included an essential patent-law ingredient that was the subject of 
an actual dispute between the parties.301 With this as its starting point, 
290. 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
291. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1267. 
292. Id. at 1273. 
293. Id. at 1269. 
294. Id. at 1272. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
300. Id. at 1283.  
301. Id. at 1285. 
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the Immunocept court addressed the last two prongs of the Grable test 
jointly. In that discussion, the court relied on three factors in concluding 
that the plaintiff’s patent-law-premised malpractice claim arose under 
federal law: (1) the federal issue presented in the case was important as a 
matter of patent law; (2) the issue was one that called for the expertise of 
federal judges from which litigants would benefit; and (3) the exercise of 
jurisdiction under the circumstances was consistent with congressional 
intent.302 
Air Measurement and Immunocept are almost perfect exemplars of 
the classic and modified legal process method. Each is premised on 
durable jurisdictional principles of general applicability, which each 
court applied consistently with the full range of constitutional structure 
in mind, including the right of individual claimants to seek a federal 
forum under standards consistent with congressional intent. The courts’ 
analyses also provide a straightforward, reasoned elaboration in that the 
conclusions reached logically proceed from the principled premise on 
which they are based. It almost goes without saying (but I have to say 
it!) that both cases are consistent with the claim-centered approach to 
jurisdiction developed in Part I.B of this article and, hence, are 
consistent with Gully. 
In his then-pending case before the Texas Court of Appeals, Minton 
now argued, based on Air Measurement and Immunocept, that his legal 
malpractice action belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of federal 
courts.303 The state appellate court disagreed and held that Minton’s state 
law malpractice claims did not “arise under” federal law.304 Specifically, 
the Court of Appeals’ majority held that the third and fourth prongs of 
the Grable test had not been satisfied.305 
In so ruling, the state court declined to follow the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept, explaining that those 
rulings were not binding on it.306 The appellate court further observed 
that, in its view, the Federal Circuit misapplied United States Supreme 
Court precedent by disregarding the “federalism” component of the 
Grable test and by misapplying the substantiality requirement.307 
Minton appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.308 The Texas high 
302. Id. at 1285–86. 
303. Minton v. Gunn, 301 S.W. 3d 702, 708 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
304. Id. at 709. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. 2011). 
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court applied the Grable test and, finding each prong of that test to have 
been satisfied, held that Minton’s legal malpractice claim fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.309 The majority’s reasoning 
largely tracked the decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept.310 
Under this approach, the first two Grable prongs were easily satisfied 
since Minton’s malpractice claim was dependent on a question of patent 
law and since the parties disputed the application of that federal standard 
under the facts presented.311 The question of substantiality was resolved 
by reference to the significant role the patent law issue played within the 
context of the plaintiff’s claim.312 Finally, with respect to the balance 
between federal and state court jurisdiction, the Texas court emphasized 
the strong federal interest in the uniform application of patent law.313 
On October 5, 2012,314 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gunn 
v. Minton on the following question: 
Did the Federal Circuit depart from the standard this Court 
articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), for “arising under” 
jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, when 
it held that state law legal malpractice claims against trial 
lawyers for their handling of underlying patent matters come 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts? Because 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals 
involving patents, are state courts and federal courts strictly 
following the Federal Circuit’s mistaken standard, thereby 
magnifying its jurisdictional error and sweeping broad swaths of 
state law claims - which involve no actual patents and have no 
impact on actual patent rights - into the federal courts?315 
Thus, the issue presented in Gunn was whether a state-based 
malpractice claim that requires the resolution of a federal patent law 
question arises under federal law for purposes of § 1338. 
Before we analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in that case, we will 
address the issue under the standards established by Gully and through 
the lens of the proposed modified legal process model. 
309. Id. at 642–47. 
310. See id. 
311. Id. at 642–43. 
312. Id. at 643. 
313. Id. at 644–46. 
314. Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012) (granting certiorari). 
315. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (No. 11-
1118) (filed Mar. 9, 2012). 
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V. GUNN THROUGH THE UNIFIED CLAIM-CENTERED 
APPROACH 
When deciding whether a case arises under federal law, the essential 
question should be whether the plaintiff’s claim depends on the 
construction, validity, or effect of federal law.316 Resolving this question 
does not require the application of any multi-pronged or mechanical test. 
Nor does this question require a distinction between causes of action 
created by federal law and state causes of action that include an essential 
federal ingredient. In both circumstances, the relevant litigation unit is 
the claim. Hence, the jurisdictional analysis requires nothing more than a 
careful assessment of the claim and a sound judgment as to the role that 
the federal question plays in the resolution of that claim. It would be 
difficult to improve on Justice Cardozo’s earlier quoted admonition in 
Gully: 
What is needed is something of that common-sense 
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which 
characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation. 
One could carry the search for causes backward, almost without 
end. Instead, there has been a selective process which picks the 
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside. 
As in problems of causation, so here in the search for the 
underlying law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless 
claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their 
operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the 
Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon 
legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have 
formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic 
and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary 
and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if 
we put that compass by.317 
The only policy reflected in Justice Cardozo’s analysis is one of 
careful judgment in determining whether the role played by the federal 
question in the claim is sufficiently important to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Thus, the entire analysis focuses on a durable principle, and 
no mechanical test or formula can improve on that. Rather, as indicated 
by Justice Cardozo, a mechanical approach carries the risk of creating 
doctrinal labyrinths from which there is no exit. 
316. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Tennessee v. Union & 
Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). 
317. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936) (citations omitted). 
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One could argue that the approach offered by Justice Cardozo in 
Gully is too broad and too vague, and that the tests and the doctrinal 
formulas later endorsed by the Supreme Court in cases such as 
Franchise Tax Board, Merell Dow, Christianson, Grable, and Empire 
were necessary to give content and contour to the general principles and 
foundations identified in Gully. Yet, history belies this. Decades before 
Gully, the Court had established that the focus of the arising-under 
jurisdictional analysis was on the plaintiff’s claim and on the federal 
question substantially involved in that claim. There had been no 
indication that this formula was not working or that it had caused a flood 
of litigation in the federal courts. As explained in Shulthis,318 if the 
plaintiff’s claim depended on the “validity, construction, or effect” of 
federal law,319 that claim gave rise to a true controversy on federal law 
which, as such, deserved a federal forum.320 The standard may have been 
simple, but it was not vague. 
Any additional inquiry is a distraction from these fundamental 
questions and could lead to results inconsistent with the underlying 
durable principle and with congressional intent. For example, to ask 
simply whether federal law has created a claim is to misstate the inquiry. 
The issue is not one of creation or of the source of the right being sued 
upon, but rather pertains solely to the nature of the claim. This approach 
is fully consistent with the classic and modified legal process model. It 
reflects the entire range of structural considerations that ought to be 
included in a legal process methodology. It renders to federal courts that 
which is truly federal in nature (federalism and supremacy), it respects 
the judgment of Congress (separation of powers), and it measures the 
scope of jurisdiction from the perspective of the individual’s claim of 
right (individual rights). 
Likewise, to speak in terms of an essential federal ingredient adds an 
additional layer of complexity to the analysis by suggesting that a 
different line of inquiry is needed to assess the availability of federal 
question jurisdiction in that particular context. 
Highly specific tests and rules are sometimes used by legal systems to 
achieve impartiality and certainty in the administration of justice. 
Moreover, the application of mechanical tests is easier than going 
beneath the form to substance of the matter.321 Today, however, legal 
318. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912). 
319. Id. at 570. 
320. Id.  
321. Roscoe Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 42 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
445, 452–53 (1919).  
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systems have become too complex to be managed by narrow rules and 
tests and “[i]t is . . . in the maturity of law that men acquire confidence 
in reasoning as an infallible, impersonal instrument, quite as reliable as 
mechanical forms and much superior in its results.”322 This more flexible 
method of legal analysis is more successful than one that proceeds 
through narrow rules and tests, “[f]or human interests will assert 
themselves continually in new ways and significant institutions of every-
day life often arise extra-legally and produce their most important results 
independent of or even against the law.”323 
Thus, the proper question to guide the arising-under analysis is simply 
whether the plaintiff’s claim truly involves the construction, validity, or 
effect of federal law. Certainly this is the approach that was applied in 
Smith,324 and the one that was endorsed in Justice Frankfurter’s oft-
quoted description of federal question jurisdiction: 
Almost without exception, decisions under the general statutory 
grants have tested jurisdiction in terms of the presence, as an 
integral part of plaintiff’s cause of action, of an issue calling for 
interpretation or application of federal law. E.g., Gully v. First 
National Bank, 299 U.S. 109. Although it has sometimes been 
suggested that the “cause of action” must derive from federal 
law, see American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co., 
241 U.S. 257, it has been found sufficient that some aspect of 
federal law is essential to plaintiff’s success. Smith v. Kansas 
City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180. The litigation-provoking 
problem has been the degree to which federal law must be in the 
forefront of the case and not collateral, peripheral or remote.325 
Once it is established that the plaintiff’s claim requires the 
determination of a federal question, the natural consequence should be 
that that a federal court may address that question. True, federal courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction. However, they were created in part to 
ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law. 
Any artificial limitation on the access to federal courts undermines that 
purpose. Also, if a non-frivolous federal question appears in the case, 
exercising arising-under jurisdiction over that question cannot, by 
definition, upset the congressionally mandated balance between federal 
and state courts in the absence of an express congressional direction to 
322. Id. at 453. 
323. Id.  
324. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
325. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(parallel citations omitted).  
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the contrary. Whether the exercise of federal question jurisdiction upsets 
the congressionally mandated balance is a question for Congress 
ultimately to decide, and Congress is fully capable of doing that. Indeed, 
one wonders how a court can ever know whether some exercise of 
federal question jurisdiction would upset that balance other than through 
sheer speculation. Moreover, it is unclear on what legitimate basis a 
federal court judge should have the authority to force cases involving 
basic and necessary federal questions into state courts. 
Thus, the way out of the maze created by the modern approach to 
federal question jurisdiction is to be found in the claim-centered 
approach as exemplified in Gully and not in some further elaborations of 
Grable or any of the other recent jurisdictional cases. Indeed, the second, 
third and fourth prongs of Grable are all suspect. As to the second, given 
that the jurisdictional analysis must be carried out solely by reference to 
the plaintiff’s complaint, the Grable Court’s requirement that the federal 
issue be actually disputed is impossible to apply, for no actual dispute 
can be assessed by reference to only one side of the controversy. Hence, 
a lower federal court’s effort to determine whether a federal issue is 
actually disputed in a case is misplaced and completely inconsistent with 
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
The third Grable inquiry—the substantiality of the federal issue—is 
redundant. Establishing the existence of a true and colorable controversy 
on the construction, validity, or effect of federal law should create the 
strongest possible presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction. No 
independent inquiry into substantiality need be required. In fact, learning 
from the struggles, and the diverging approaches, of the lower courts, 
and from Gully and Smith, a federal issue should be considered 
“substantial” if it is meaningful within the context of the litigation, i.e., 
colorable and essential within that proceeding. And, certainly, if a 
federal question plays an important role in the case, the strongest 
presumption should be that there is a federal forum available to hear that 
claim. Thus, the last Grable inquiry—the possible veto—is illegitimate. 
In fact, in light of the strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction when a 
federal question is truly presented, only a clear signal from Congress to 
the contrary should provide a sufficient rebuttal. 
The answer to the issue presented by Gunn should now be easy. In 
Gunn, the malpractice litigation was truly about patent law. If it were 
concluded that Minton’s lawyers improperly failed to raise the 
experimental use exception in the Patent Litigation, Minton would 
prevail on his legal malpractice claim. To make that determination, it 
would be necessary to interpret and apply the standards of patent law to 
the facts relevant to Minton’s malpractice claim. Thus, the controversy 
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over the federal issue is neither collateral nor merely possible. Rather, 
the controversy over the proper interpretation and application of the 
experimental use exception is basic and necessary to the resolution of 
Minton’s claim. This is a quintessential question for federal courts. 
Having established this proposition, any additional analysis required by 
Grable would be either redundant or illegitimate. Moreover, any 
contrary conclusion on the jurisdictional issue would simply be wrong 
because Congress has in no way suggested that jurisdiction should be 
unavailable for the adjudication of such federal issues. Quite the 
opposite: by giving exclusive federal question jurisdiction over patent 
law claims and patent law counterclaims,326 Congress has expressed a 
clear mandate that patent law issues should be welcomed by, and 
adjudicated in, federal courts and only in federal courts.327 
The Gunn Court arrived at a different conclusion, not under a 
different interpretation of Gully, but under an approach that draws a 
bright-line distinction between causes of action created by federal law 
and state law claims containing an essential federal ingredient. This 
approach essentially ignores Gully and turns a blind eye to congressional 
intent in an apparent effort to reduce the federal courts’ caseload. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S MECHANICAL SOLUTION IN 
GUNN 
The Gunn Court began its analysis by admitting that its arising-under 
jurisprudence had come to resemble a “Jackson Pollock” canvas.328 
However, as the Court explained, Grable was designed to “bring some 
order to this unruly doctrine,”329 and, in the Court’s view, resolution of 
the issue in Gunn required nothing more than a straightforward 
application of the four-prong Grable test—a myopic paint-by-numbers 
approach to jurisdiction under which a judge may never look at, much 
less consider, the picture as a whole. 
In applying that test, the Court acknowledged that the “resolution of 
326. See the “Holmes Group fix,” contained in Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331 
(2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2007–2012)). 
327. Id. Apropos to that mandate, leaving disputes over federal law such as that presented in 
Gunn to state courts would pose the risk of inconsistent interpretations and applications of a body of 
law that Congress wanted exclusively decided by federal courts. Patent lawyers would have to be 
aware of the federal interpretation of patent law and of individual state courts’ interpretation of that 
law under which they could be subject to malpractice. This complexity would certainly have an 
impact on the litigation of patent issues in federal courts. 
328. Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). 
329. Id. 
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[a] federal patent question [was] ‘necessary’ to Minton’s case”330 and 
that the patent-law issue was “the central point of dispute.”331 The third 
and fourth prongs of the Grable test, however, proved fatal to Minton’s 
quest for exclusive federal jurisdiction.332 
On the question of substantiality, the Court admonished the Supreme 
Court of Texas for focusing “on the importance of the issue to the 
plaintiff’s case and to the parties before it.”333 The Court explained, 
“The substantiality inquiry under Grable looks instead to the importance 
of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”334 The Court followed up 
on this observation by explaining that in Grable the “Federal 
Government” had a “strong interest” in the resolution of the federal issue 
there presented.335 Hence, the exercise of jurisdiction there was in order. 
The Gunn Court’s treatment of substantiality was particularly 
troubling. First, the artificial distinction between cases satisfying the 
creation test and cases satisfying the essential federal ingredient test is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, traceable largely to Merrell Dow. 
Certainly, the Court in Smith did not create a novel jurisdictional 
doctrine.336 Prior to Merrell Dow, the decision in Gully had fully 
captured a unified arising-under theory. That theory focused on the 
importance of the federal issue to the plaintiff’s claim, an approach that 
seemed completely consistent with the congressional intent to create a 
federal forum for the resolution of claims premised on questions of 
federal law. Also, there is no evidence that Congress wanted the courts 
to adopt a narrower construction of arising-under jurisdiction in federal-
ingredient cases. Hence, this distinction, however useful it may be in 
reducing the federal courts’ caseload, is nothing more than a creature of 
judicial imagination.337 
Federal courts were created by Congress and vested with federal 
question jurisdiction for the benefit of litigants, not for the benefit of the 
federal system or federal judges. The notion that federal question 
jurisdiction should turn on the interest of the federal government or on 
330. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. See id. at 1066–68. 
333. Id. at 1066.  
334. Id.  
335. Id. 
336. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2153 (essential federal ingredient cases “were 
perhaps the paradigm ‘arising under’ cases” in the nineteenth century). 
337. See F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 895, 923–25 (2009). 
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the interest of the federal system (whatever that may mean), or in federal 
judges’ perception as to the burden of their caseload, is wholly 
inconsistent with this principle. This notion, first introduced in 1986 in 
Merrell Dow and further developed in Grable and Empire, seems to be 
more in service of the judiciary’s interest in docket management than it 
is faithful to congressional intent. Indeed, given that the purpose of 
federal question jurisdiction is to serve litigants who assert claims 
premised on federal law, this newly created principle flies in the face of 
congressional intent and the structural principles of separation of powers 
and the protection of individual claims of right.338 
The Supreme Court is of course free to change doctrine. As I 
previously noted, courts retain an important role in statesmanship. But 
nothing in the Court’s recent federal-question jurisprudence suggests 
that its abandonment of both Gully’s durable principle and a claim-
centered approach to jurisdiction is a product of statesmanship. Rather, 
given the workability of the established principles, the exercise of 
jurisdiction would seem to call for an exercise of judicial craftsmanship, 
a skill that is sorely lacking in the Court’s recent federal-question 
jurisprudence. 
The Gunn Court also thought that the federal issue presented there 
was not substantial because it was “posed in a merely hypothetical 
sense: If Minton’s lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use 
argument, would the result in the patent infringement proceeding have 
been different?”339 It is true that the resolution of this question would not 
have altered the judgment already rendered in the patent litigation. 
However, this “hypothetical” issue was, as the Court noted, essential to 
Minton’s claim and, if he prevailed on it, he would be entitled to 
significant monetary damages from his former attorneys.340 In addition, 
this hypothetical patent law decision, if resolved by the state courts, 
would necessarily have an effect on patent law attorneys practicing in 
that state, for they would have to adjust their patent litigation practices to 
the patent law interpretations rendered by the courts of the state in which 
they practice. One might think that this collateral consequence would be 
of interest to the “federal system,” but the Court offers no elaboration, 
338. Congress has consistently indicated its intent to open the doors of federal courts to a wide 
range of federal question cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (extending patent arising under 
jurisdiction to patent law counterclaims); id. § 1367(a) (broad supplemental jurisdiction over claims 
and parties in federal question cases); id. § 1441(c) (removal of federal question cases that have 
been joined with otherwise non-removable claims); id. § 1454 (authorizing removal of actions in 
which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under patent or copyright law). 
339. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067. 
340. Id. at 1067–68. 
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reasoned or otherwise, of why it did not matter. 
The Court, borrowing from Empire and measuring the case before it 
against a mechanical test rather than a durable principle, also noted that 
“[t]he present case is ‘poles apart from Grable,’ in which . . . resolution 
of the federal question ‘would be controlling in numerous other 
cases.’”341 This is a curious observation, since the federal issue in 
Grable was not important enough for the Supreme Court to review on 
certiorari. Instead, the Supreme Court left that question to the lower 
courts. One also wonders how a federal district court, measuring arising-
under jurisdiction from the perspective of the plaintiff’s complaint, could 
possibly determine whether the federal issue presented is going to be 
controlling in numerous other cases. Certainly, the Court has offered no 
workable method through which a federal court can assess this impact 
other than by looking at the court’s own caseload which often will not 
fully reflect the importance of an issue on a national basis. 
The Court also observed that the “fact-bound and situation-specific” 
nature of the federal issue weighted against the exercise of federal 
question jurisdiction.342 However, as the Court noted in Osborn v. Bank 
of the United States,343 “[a] cause may depend on several questions of 
fact and law.”344 Thus, the Gunn Court’s narrow view of the role of 
federal court jurisdiction as one pertaining only to the interpretation of 
law, overlooks the important fact-finding role of federal trial courts345 
and again fails to account for a federal court’s role in providing a federal 
forum for the vindication of individual claims of right. 
Finally, the Court’s treatment of the fourth Grable prong was 
peculiar. The Court suggested that because the third prong was not 
satisfied, the fourth was not either, essentially rendering the fourth prong 
meaningless.346 The Court did observe, however, that the states have a 
special interest in policing members of “licensed professions.”347 As to 
the legal profession, the Court noted that the states’ “interest . . . in 
regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the 
primary governmental function of administering justice, and have 
341. Id. at 1067 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700 
(2006)). 
342. Id. at 1068. 
343. 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
344. Id. at 821. 
345. See supra text accompanying note 259. 
346. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068. 
347. Id.  
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historically been officers of the courts.”348 
Yet the Court did not explain why a state would have a paramount 
interest in ensuring the competence of lawyers litigating patent law 
issues in federal courts. Nor did the Court consider the countervailing 
federal interest in the competence of those lawyers, who are, after all, 
members of the federal bar. The Court’s reasoning here is illogical in 
that a state’s general interest in regulating the practice of law does not 
establish a specific interest in regulating the practice of law in federal 
courts exercising exclusive federal jurisdiction. Also, the Court fell into 
the trap of treating federalism as a narrow concept reflecting only the 
“states’ rights” side of the equation. Hence, the opinion on this point 
runs afoul of the principles of structural interpretation and reasoned 
elaboration. 
***** 
As it stands right now, after the decision in Gunn, the essential federal 
ingredient test requires (at a minimum) four elements: (1) an essential 
federal ingredient embedded in a state law claim, that is (2) actually 
disputed, (3) substantial—i.e., (i) an issue of law, (ii) important to the 
federal system, and (iii) controlling numerous other cases—and (4) such 
that assigning it to federal courts would not distort the appropriate 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities as envisioned by the 
courts. In addition to the above, however, one must also take into 
account the other factors that the lower courts continue to apply. 
Under the standards established in Gunn, it will be a very rare federal-
ingredient case indeed that qualifies for statutory arising-under 
jurisdiction. To put it differently, it would be very easy for a busy 
federal judge to apply Gunn to find jurisdiction lacking. Yet, if a case 
truly presents a federal issue that is at the forefront of a state-created 
claim, it should be the exceptional circumstance under which jurisdiction 
is denied. 
As Justice Brennan observed in his Merrell Dow dissent: 
Congress passes laws in order to shape behavior; a federal law 
expresses Congress’ determination that there is a federal interest 
in having individuals or other entities conform their actions to a 
particular norm established by that law . . . . It is the duty of 
courts to interpret these laws and apply them in such a way that 
the congressional purpose is realized . . . . Congress granted the 
district courts power to hear cases “arising under” federal law in 
order to enhance the likelihood that federal laws would be 
348. Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)). 
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interpreted more correctly and applied more uniformly. In other 
words, Congress determined that the availability of a federal 
forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions would 
make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in 
the way that Congress intended. 
By making federal law an essential element of a state-law claim, 
the State places the federal law into a context where it will 
operate to shape behavior: the threat of liability will force 
individuals to conform their conduct to interpretations of the 
federal law made by courts adjudicating the state-law claim . . . . 
Consequently, the possibility that the federal law will be 
incorrectly interpreted in the context of adjudicating the state-
law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the 
district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal 
questions in precisely the same way as if it was federal law that 
“created” the cause of action.349 
To be sure, if Congress expressly precludes the exercise of 
jurisdiction, a court must conform to that express intent. There might 
also be other circumstances indicating a congressional intent to limit 
jurisdiction over particular federal questions, or to give courts discretion 
as to whether a particular form of jurisdiction should be exercised.350 But 
whether there are such circumstances should not be dependent on an 
artificial, judicially created four-part test. That artificial test allows 
judges to ignore congressional intent and to reject federal jurisdiction at 
the expense of allowing plaintiffs to have their federal claim heard in a 
federal court. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The current law of federal question jurisdiction is just another 
example of the problems generated by the proliferation of doctrines and 
tests apparently intended to provide guidance to lower courts and 
perhaps cabin their discretion. However, this proliferation of doctrines 
and tests ends up, as the Court itself has admitted, creating a Jackson 
Pollock canvas,351 cluttering the analysis with irrelevancies and 
illegitimate considerations that stray far from the durable principles that 
349. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827–28 (1986) (Brennan, J. 
dissenting). 
350. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (giving federal courts discretion with respect to hearing 
certain supplemental jurisdiction claims). 
351. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065. 
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should instead guide the courts. The results are often confusing, rarely 
helpful and frequently inconsistent with the fundamental principles that 
they purport to apply. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn represents the Supreme 
Court’s most recent statement on the law of arising-under jurisdiction in 
the context of a federal question embedded in a state-law claim. The 
decision appears inconsistent with virtually all classic and modified legal 
process principles. As to the principle of structural interpretation, the 
Court overplays federalism by failing to take into account other 
countervailing interests such as federal supremacy, actual congressional 
intent, and individuals’ congressionally vested right to access a federal 
forum on claims that truly raise federal issues—issues as to which a 
federal court may be more expert and fairer than its state counterpart. 
The Court’s decision also challenges the institutional settlement 
principle by adopting what is in essence a procedural test that will lead 
to ad hoc and unpredictable results. In addition, the Gunn opinion’s free-
style interpretation of federal statutes represents a type of anti-formalism 
that borders on legal realism, and that allows the judicially perceived 
interests of the “federal system” to trump a wider spectrum of legitimate 
and constitutionally demanded interests, including the actual intent of 
Congress. As Cardozo observed, 
Judges have, of course, the power, though not the right, to ignore the 
mandate of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it. They have the 
power, though not the right, to travel beyond the walls of the interstices, 
the bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom. None the 
less, by that abuse of power, they violate the law.352 
Gunn is also inconsistent with the rule of law principle, for it designs 
a completely unpredictable and unworkable procedure that allows 
federal courts to divest themselves of cases that would otherwise 
sensibly fall within the scope of arising-under jurisdiction. Next, as I 
have already explained, several passages of the opinion fail to satisfy 
any sensible standard of reasonable elaboration. But most importantly, 
the major flaw with the Gunn opinion, as with several of the Court’s 
other recent procedural decisions,353 is its mechanical, test-driven 
352. CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 129. 
353. For an analysis of this phenomenon in related contexts, see Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens 
Reconsidered, supra note 5; Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth With No Exit, 
supra note 5; Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, The Purposeful Availment Trap, 7 FED. CT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013); Allan Ides, A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. 
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (2012); Allan Ides, The Standard 
for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate between 
Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041 (2011). 
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approach to doctrine that operates contrary to the valid, durable 
principles and fails to provide any real guidance to lower courts and 
litigants in the application of the law. This myopic test-driven approach 
is not only inappropriate but it is inefficient, for it requires continuous 
interventions by the Court to revisit its earlier pronouncements that have 
proven themselves inadequate and theoretically ungrounded.354 
While there is clearly a need for the Court to again visit the statutory 
arising-under topic, one would be naïve to believe that the next visit will 
suddenly rescue certainty from this sea of confusion. In the meantime, 
the level of unpredictability and unfairness will likely remain high. 
While it may often be healthy that reasonable minds differ, this is not 
true with respect to the standards that govern the access to the federal 
courts. These standards, particularly for federal question cases, should be 
clear, fair, and true to the underlying intent of Congress, rather than 
subject to the unfettered discretion of courts that may be interested in 
reducing their caseload. 
 
354. An apt example of this phenomenon can be seen in the law of personal jurisdiction where 
the Court seems unable to find a transcendent, theoretical principle to meaningfully guide the 
analysis. Thus, on March 4, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walden v. Fiore, 
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1493 (2013), yet another case involving personal jurisdiction. See Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari at i, Walden v. Fiore, No. 12-574 (filed Nov. 6, 2012). This happened less than 
two years after the Court decided two other personal jurisdiction cases, Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2010), and J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  
 
                                                     
